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Abstract in English 
Whenever you phone your mother, switch on the light, or buy health insurance you purchase a 
service or product from a chain of vertically related industries. Providers of these products  or 
services need access to a telecommunications network, an electricity network or to health care 
services. In such industries, integration and exclusive contracts between vertically related firms 
may have important welfare enhancing effects, but can also deny or limit rivals’ access to input 
or customers, leading to foreclosure. Foreclosure can harm welfare if it reduces competition.  
This document provides policymakers with a framework to assess the potential for welfare 
reducing foreclosure of vertical integration and vertical restraints and describes possible 
remedies. The framework consists of four steps. Each step requires its own detailed analysis.  
First, market power should exist either upstream or downstream. Second, a theory of 
foreclosure should be formulated that explains why foreclosure is a profitable equilibrium 
strategy. Third, the existence and magnitude of potential welfare enhancing effects of the 
vertical restrains or vertical integration should be assessed. Fourth, suitable policies to address 
foreclosure should be found.  
 
Key words: Vertical foreclosure, Competition policy, Network industries 
JEL code:  L13, L42, L51 
Abstract in Dutch 
Als je naar huis belt, het licht aandoet, of een zorgverzekering koopt, neem je een product af 
van een verticale keten van toeleveranciers en verkopende bedrijven. Aanbieders van deze 
producten hebben toegang nodig tot een telecommunicatienetwerk, een elektriciteitsnetwerk en 
zorgdiensten. Integratie en exclusieve contracten tussen bedrijven in zo’n verticale keten 
kunnen belangrijke welvaartsverhogende effecten hebben, maar ook de toegang van 
concurrenten tot input of klanten beperken. In het laatste geval leiden ze tot uitsluiting. 
Uitsluiting kan schadelijk zijn voor de welvaart als dit de concurrentie vermindert. 
Dit document biedt beleidsmakers een raamwerk om het risico te bepalen van 
welvaartverlagende uitsluiting door integratie of exclusieve contracten en beschrijft mogelijke 
oplossingen. Het raamwerk bestaat uit vier stappen, die elk een gedetailleerde analyse vereisen. 
Ten eerste moet er bovenstrooms of benedenstrooms markmacht bestaan. Ten tweede moet 
uitsluiting een winstgevende evenwichtsstrategie zijn. Ten derde is van belang welke 
welvaartsverhogende effecten bestaan en hoe groot deze zijn. Ten vierde moeten er geschikte 
beleidsmaatregelen gevonden worden om uitsluiting tegen te gaan.  
 
Steekwoorden: Verticale uitsluiting, Mededingingsbeleid, Netwerk industrieën.  4   5 
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Preface 
In recently deregulated markets, such as the telecommunications, the electricity, and the health 
care sector foreclosure features prominently on the policy agenda. Foreclosure also plays an 
important role in the assessment of mergers and the application of antitrust law. Policymakers 
wonder whether there is a risk of welfare reducing foreclosure and what measures may address 
this problem.  
However, a priori foreclosure neither lowers nor raises welfare. In addition, there are 
various strategies that can lead to foreclosure. It is therefore often challenging to assess the 
potential for welfare reducing foreclosure and to find suitable remedies. This document 
provides a policy framework rooted in theory and empirics to assist policymakers in their 
decisions. 
Michiel Bijlsma, Viktoria Kocsis, Victoria Shestalova and Gijsbert Zwart wrote the study, 
which benefited from discussions with our CPB colleagues Paul de Bijl, Bas Straathof and 
Henry van der Wiel. We gratefully acknowledge comments by Jan Kees Winters (NMa), 
Gulbahar Tezel (NMa), Vincent Verouden (EC), Jan Boone (UvT), Marco Haan (RUG), Ilaria 
Mosca (NZa), Sander Onderstal (UvA), Robert Stil (OPTA), and Tjade Stroband (EZ) that have 
led to many improvements. The responsibility for the content and the conclusions of this report 




   8   9 
Summary 
Whenever you phone your mother, switch on the light, buy health insurance, connect to the 
Internet or turn on the television you are part of a chain of vertically related industries. Your 
telephony, television or internet provider needs access to a telecommunications network to 
reach you. Your electricity producers can only supply electricity to your doorstep through an 
electricity transport network. Your health care insurer needs to contract health care services 
with the hospital you visit. 
In such industries, integration and exclusive contracts between vertically related firms can 
have important welfare enhancing effects relating to the alignment of pricing or investment 
incentives. However, these strategies may also affect rivals’ abilities to compete by denying or 
limiting access to the market, i.e., they may lead to foreclosure. Foreclosure can harm welfare if 
it reduces competition. An assessment of these strategies’ potential for welfare reducing 
foreclosure is challenging for three reasons. First, a priori foreclosure is neither good nor bad 
for welfare. Second, it can be the result of different commercial strategies. Third, the analysis 
and effects of foreclosure are sensitive to the prevailing market structure. 
The potential for welfare reducing foreclosure continues to play an important role in the 
policy debate on recently liberalised sectors, antitrust enforcement and merger control. 
Policymakers worry that vertical integration and vertical restraints can lead to welfare reducing 
foreclosure and try to find policy measures to address this problem. This document aims to 
provide policymakers with a framework rooted in theory and empirics to assess the potential for 
welfare reducing foreclosure of vertical integration and vertical restraints and describes possible 
remedies. 
An assessment of the potential for welfare reducing vertical foreclosure should consist of 
four steps. First, foreclosure should have the potential to reduce competition. Both theory and 
empirics show that vertical foreclosure is not very likely to be welfare reducing when there is 
fierce competition both upstream and downstream. If exclusive contracts or vertical integration 
occur in such markets (and they do in reality), it will be to increase efficiency by eliminating 
double marginalisation, free rider effects or hold up problems. 
Second, if welfare reducing foreclosure is possible in principle, we should assess whether it 
is also likely to happen in practise. The theory presented in chapter 2 provides guidance in 
finding circumstances that make anticompetitive foreclosure profitable market equilibrium. We 
distinguish between two types of foreclosure: input foreclosure and customer foreclosure. Input 
foreclosure means that downstream retailers are foreclosed from buying from a particular 
upstream supplier. Customer foreclosure means that an upstream supplier is foreclosed from 
selling to a particular retailer. The theory predicts that the likeliness and type of welfare 
reducing vertical foreclosure differs between markets with and without vertical integration. In 
addition, markets with competing vertically integrated combinations differ from markets with a   10 
single vertically integrated entity. In the absence of vertical integration, the following three 
cases can be distinguished 
1.  If a monopoly exists upstream while the downstream industry is potentially competitive, there is 
a danger of input foreclosure. Customer foreclosure is not an issue here, because there is only 
one upstream firm.  
2.  If a monopoly exists downstream while the upstream industry is potentially competitive there is 
little probability of customer foreclosure. Input foreclosure is not an issue because there is only 
one downstream firm.  
3.  If both the upstream as well as the downstream market are oligopolistic, while economies of 
scale or network effects are important upstream, customer foreclosure may occur. Entry in the 
upstream market then requires a particular scale and may be prohibited by signing exclusive 
contracts with a sufficient number of downstream retailers. However, fierce downstream 
competition may reduce the number of contracted retailers necessary to achieve sufficient scale 
for entry. 
 
In the presence of vertical integration, the following three cases can be distinguished 
1.  If a monopoly exists upstream while the downstream industry is competitive, then some degree 
of foreclosure is likely without the need for explicit exclusion. By vertically integrating, the 
monopolist can credibly limit supplies to non-integrated retailers. 
2.  However, exclusion is less likely if there are (non-integrated) upstream rivals that are efficient. 
The integrated firm is limited in its possibility to extracts rents from the retailer by the retailer’s 
option of sourcing from the upstream rival. 
3.  If upstream competition is less fierce (for example because upstream rivals are less efficient): 
firms may choose to physically commit (e.g. by choosing incompatibility) to exclusive 
practices. 
 
If multiple competing vertically integrated combinations exist, the following two cases can 
be distinguished. 
 
1.  Foreclosure of downstream entrants becomes less likely as they are more likely to win market 
share from integrated competitors (e.g. if upstream products are close substitutes). 
2.  Foreclosure of downstream entrants becomes more likely if their retail products are closer 
substitutes to the provider’s own retail products than to those of the provider’s vertically 
integrated rivals (e.g. if upstream products are very differentiated). 
 
Third, if a theory of foreclosure is formulated, we should assess whether there exist welfare 
enhancing effects of the vertical restraints or vertical integration that can outweigh the   11 
detrimental effects. The empirical literature suggests that such effects are almost always 
present, but does not distinguish between different effects. On the basis of economic theory it is 
often possible to argue that some effects are more likely than others to be present. However, 
assessing the magnitude of the various effects is a challenging exercise in practice to which we 
offer no guidance.  
Fourth, if foreclosure is likely and the welfare decreasing effects outweigh the welfare 
enhancing effects, we should assess what policies are suitable to address foreclosure. Here it is 
important to realize that there are several ways of achieving foreclosure and banning one of 
them will lead firms to substitute another. In addition, different policy instruments differ in 
intrusiveness and complexity. Finally, although there is no straightforward answer to this 
question, it is important to think about the consequences of false positives and false negatives. 
What is worse for welfare: prohibiting a contract or merger for which the welfare enhancing 
effects outweigh the welfare reducing effects or allowing a contract or merger for which the 
welfare reducing effects outweigh the welfare enhancing effects? If the former is worse that the 
latter, policymakers should be lenient on foreclosure. If the opposite is the case, they should be 
tough on foreclosure. We stress that there is no unambiguous answer to this question because 
the answer depends in part on the relation between innovation and competition, which can be 
either increasing or decreasing. 
 
   12   13 
1  Introduction 
Whenever you phone your mother, switch on the light, buy health insurance, connect to the 
Internet or turn on the television you are part of a chain of vertically related industries. Your 
telephony, television or internet provider needs access to a telecommunications network to 
reach you. Your electricity producers can only supply electricity to your doorstep through an 
electricity transport network. Your health care insurer needs to contract health care services 
with the hospital you visit. 
Firms operating at different levels in vertically related markets have to decide individually 
on strategic variables (for example prices and investments) that affect their joint profits. This 
can lead to conflicting incentives and decisions that are inefficient from a joint perspective. For 
example, given the price for the transport of electricity, your energy provider wants to raise the 
price you pay as high as possible to increase its profits. At the same time, however, the transport 
network wants the energy retailer to lower its price as far as possible, so that it can transport 
more electricity and increase its profit. Your health insurer may want to invest in preventive 
measures implemented by health care providers, thereby lowering its future expenses. However, 
if you decide to switch to another insurer afterwards, the latter will free ride on these 
investments. This reduces your insurer’s incentives to invest in your health. 
Firms can often align their incentives and (partially) restore joint efficiency by using vertical 
restraints or by vertically integrating. Examples of such strategies abound. Microsoft signed a 
variety of exclusionary contracts involving browser use and promotion with computer 
manufacturers, Internet access providers, Internet content providers and software vendors 
(Whinston (2001)). In Germany, ice-cream producers Langnese-Iglo and Schöller used 
exclusive purchasing agreements that required retail outlets to exclusively carry ice-cream. 
Exclusive contracts are usual in the beer market, where brewers require exclusivity from pubs, 
sometimes in return providing financing for interior decoration of the pub. The Dutch health 
care insurer Menzis recently acquired local general practitioners in the cities of Tiel and 
Houten.
1 In the telecommunications market, vertical integration between retailers and network 
providers is a key feature of the market. 
A central concern of policymakers is that these strategies may harm welfare by denying or 
limiting competitors’ access to the market. This potentially harmful effect, commonly called 
foreclosure, forms a rationale for ex ante sector regulation, plays a role in the assessment of 
mergers, and may lead to ex post intervention under competition law. It has played an important 
role in the formation of sector-specific regulators such as the Onafhankelijke Post en Telecom 
Autoriteit (OPTA) for the telecommunications sector, the Dienst Toezicht energie (DTe) for the 
energy sector and the Vervoerskamer for the public transport sector. Examples of antitrust cases 
 
1 Alleen huisartszorg Menzis in Tiel, NRC, 20 November 2007.   14 
where foreclosure featured prominently are Langnese-Iglo / Schöller, Toys ‘R’ Us, and the 
famous Microsoft case mentioned previously. 
Apart from its ongoing relevance for regulation and competition law enforcement, the issue 
of foreclosure features prominently in several current policy debates. The Dutch 
telecommunications sector is moving from a market where television and telephony were tied to 
a specific network, to a market the two networks can offer both services. This changes the 
potential for network owners to foreclose access and affects the need for regulation of access to 
these networks. At the same time, at the European level the necessity of vertical separation in 
telecommunications markets, a reality in the UK (the Openreach initiative), is being debated. In 
the Dutch healthcare market, some insurers have the intention to vertically integration with 
health care providers. Policymakers worry that this might create the ability for insurers or health 
care providers to engage in welfare reducing behaviour. In the energy sector, the emergence of 
dominant international gas suppliers such as Gazprom, has led policy makers to think about the 
effects of vertical integration of such suppliers with various national gas retailers. Does such 
integration influence the ability of Gazprom to exercise market power? Alternatively, do long 
term supply contracts with such firms constitute an attempt to foreclose new entrants? In a 
market for green certificates for renewable energy production (currently being debated in the 
Netherlands and introduced in the UK) wholesale producers of renewable energy receive a 
green certificate for every unit of renewable electricity produced. In addition, a certain 
percentages of the electricity sold by every retail supplier should be produced from renewable 
sources. Suppliers have to acquire these green certificates in order to meet their renewable 
obligation. If only a small number of energy producers have green energy production capacity, 
foreclosure is a potential problem in such a market. 
Whether or not strategies such as vertical restraints or vertical integration that may lead to 
foreclosure actually harm welfare is ambiguous. In essence, the argument why the concerns of 
policymakers might not be warranted was formulated originally by proponents of the Chicago 
school, associated with University of Chicago (see e.g. Bork (1978) or Posner (1976)). 
According to this school of thought, contracts with vertical restraints can not be used to sustain 
market power in the face of efficient entry and vertical integration can not be used to extract 
monopoly profits. Even though an exclusive contract prohibits a supplier to sell to other retailer 
or a retailer to buy from other suppliers, such contracts are motivated by efficiency 
considerations and lead to lower costs and higher output.  
Following the advent of game theory, the Chicago arguments were revisited and it was 
shown that under specific circumstances, vertical restraints and vertical integration can serve 
anti-competitive purposes. However, the theory is complex and fragmented. It is difficult for 
policymakers to distil general insights from this literature. In addition, empirical work on 
foreclosure has lagged behind, especially for markets with substantial market power where the 
issue might be most relevant, and answers provided are partial and preliminary.   15 
In general, it is therefore not straightforward to judge ex ante (1) whether foreclosure will occur 
after a merger or due to a particular contract with vertical restraints (2) whether the overall 
effect of strategies that may lead to foreclosure are detrimental to welfare or not, and (3) that 
banning a particular strategy eliminates the potential to foreclose access to intermediate 
markets. 
The aim of this document is threefold. First, to provide policy makers with a framework 
rooted in the theoretical and empirical literature to assess the potential for anti-competitive 
foreclosure. This boils down to asking the right questions in the right order. A relevant question, 
which we feel does not receive sufficient attention in current policy oriented documents, is 
whether foreclosure can be an equilibrium strategy. This question is especially important in 
market with an oligopoly both downstream and upstream. Second, we want to illustrate how to 
apply the framework in practise by discussing three policy relevant case studies. Third, we aim 
to provide a basis for further in-depth research in some of these cases. 
There exist several papers that review (part of) the literature on foreclosure, most notably 
Rey and Tirole (2003), Riordan (2005), Rey and Vergé (2005) and Church (2004). These papers 
are more theoretical in nature and aimed at an expert economic audience. Our contribution 
focuses on vertical foreclosure by means of general (pricing) contracts. We combine a 
comprehensive overview of the literature with a policy oriented framework, which is applied to 
practical cases.  
This document is structured as follows. In chapter 2, we review the theory of foreclosure. It 
starts with a discussion of possible welfare enhancing and welfare reducing effects, and 
continues with the possibility of welfare reducing foreclosure in market with upstream or 
downstream monopoly and bilateral oligopolies. Policymakers might want to skip this section 
and read only the summary of the theory (section 2.6). In chapter 3, we review the empirical 
literature. In chapter 4, based on the theory, a policy framework is laid out. Finally, in chapter 5, 
the policy framework is applied to two antitrust cases, Langnese-Schöller and Toys ‘R’ Us, and 
three case studies, the electricity, the health care and the telecommunications market.    16 
1.1  Scope  
In the economic literature, various definitions of foreclosure can be found.
2 Some definitions 
take the behaviour of firms as their starting point, whereas others define foreclosure according 
to the effect this behaviour can have. According to the former, a firm engages in foreclosure if it 
stops transacting with other firms in the intermediate goods market or if it simply increases its 
intermediate good price level for certain firms.
3 According to the latter, foreclosure only arises 
if a rival firm is actually forced to exit the market completely or if the ability of rival firms to 
compete is harmed (but they are not forced to exit the market). 
We focus on foreclosure in vertically related markets, where the intermediate input is not 
directly provided to consumers. Markets are vertically related when an intermediary good sold 
to firms in the one market (‘the upstream market’) is used as an input for a good sold to final 
consumers in the other market (‘the downstream market’). Markets are horizontally related if 
the goods in both markets are sold to final consumers. We do not consider horizontal 
foreclosure, which may occur in horizontally related markets. An example of behaviour that 
may lead to horizontal foreclosure is bundling or tying of software and hardware.  
We do not consider strategies such as predatory pricing (or limit pricing in vertically related 
markets) that may cause rivals to exit. These do not involve denying or limiting access to an 
input. Instead, firms deterring entrants by pricing aggressively, leading to an initial loss which 
they can later recoup due to increased market power. Finally, we do not consider exclusionary 
practises where a several firms coordinate their behaviour, thereby in effect forming a cartel, 
nor do we discuss the possibility of foreclosure through non pricing instruments, such as 
sabotage. These would broaden the scope of the document too much. 
For the purpose of this document, we therefore define foreclosure as behaviour in one of two 
vertically related markets where an individual firm in one of these markets directly or indirectly 
denies or limits access to its input.  
The theory of foreclosure is complex for three reasons. First, there are many different 
market structures in which foreclosure might arise. The archetypical foreclosure arises in 
market with a downstream or upstream monopoly, as depicted in figure 1.1 below. The 
upstream supplier can be either vertically integrated with a retailer or not. The gas market is an 
example of a market with a vertically separated upstream monopolist. The market for 
specialized health care provided by a local hospital can be viewed as a market with a vertically 
 
2 For example: ‘Input foreclosure occurs when the integrated firm no longer sells, or sells at a higher price to downstream 
rivals. Customer foreclosure occurs when the vertically integrated firm no longer buys from upstream rivals’, OECD (2007). 
‘A situation in which (i) a firm dominates one market (bottleneck good); and (ii) uses its market power in the bottleneck good 
market to restrict output in another market, perhaps but not necessarily by discouraging the entry or encouraging the exit of 
rivals’, Rey and Tirole (2006). ‘Strategic behaviour by a firm or group of firms to restrict market access possibilities of 
potential competitors either upstream or downstream’, EC, glossary of terms used in competition related matters, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/general_info/glossary_en.html, accessed November 2007. 
3 Note that this intermediate good or intermediate input can denote both upstream services (for example access to a 
telecommunication network) as well as downstream services (for example shelf space at a supermarket).    17 
separated downstream monopolist.
4 In the beginning of the 1990’s, when telephony markets in 
the Netherlands were first privatized, the owner of the telephony network was an example of a 
vertically integrated upstream monopolist.  
Figure 1.1           downstream or upstream monopoly 
Supplier A Supplier B
Retailer 
Supplier 
Retailer 1 Retailer 2
 
In addition, foreclosure may also arise in markets with a bilateral oligopoly and any degree of 
vertical integration between the downstream and upstream markets as depicted in figure 1.2 
below. An example of a market with multiple vertically integrated firms is the current market 
for electronic telecommunication. In the Netherlands there are two competing network 
infrastructures: the one originating in the former national telephony provider and the other 
originating in the former regional cable television provider. The beer market in the UK is an 
example of a market with partial vertical integration. Some brewers have their own pubs, 
whereas others do not. Supermarkets and their wholesale suppliers are an example of a market 
with vertical separation and upstream as well as downstream oligopoly. 
Figure 1.2          bilateral oligopoly 
Supplier A Supplier B
Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3
Supplier A Supplier B






Second, there are various strategies by which a firm can deny or limit access to its input for 
upstream or downstream competitors. Foreclosure of competitors is a direct consequence of 
exclusive contracts or a refusal to deal.
5 These contracts restrict the rights of one or both parties 
signing such an agreement to engage in businesses with other parties, leading to a complete 
denial of access to a certain facility or products produced by these firms. The main types of 
 
4 If the nearest other hospital is located sufficiently far away, and for medical treatments for which patients are reluctant to 
travel. 
5 We view refusal to deal as a contract with zero quantity or a prohibitively high price.   18 
exclusive contracts are exclusive dealing, exclusive purchasing and exclusive territories. An 
exclusive dealing agreement between a producer and a retailer requires the retailer not to 
engage in other businesses that compete with activities of the producer (or sometimes in any 
businesses). An exclusive purchasing agreement requires the retailer to buy exclusively from 
this producer. An exclusive territory agreement restricts the ‘territory’ of the retailer’s activities. 
At the same time, the producer commits not to supply to another retailer in this territory. Here 
the territory can be defined either geographically, or as a specific market segment or a customer 
group.  
However, other commercial strategies may lead to foreclosure in an indirect way. Examples 
are vertical integration, most favoured nation clauses, limitation of productive capacity or 
installing a firm-specific technology.
6 These strategies can be seen as ways to credibly commit 
not to supply downstream rivals other than a limited number of firms (possibly one firm only). 
For example, vertical integration internalises the effect of upstream pricing on downstream 
profits, which can make the commitment to foreclose credible. 
Last but not least, the practises that lead to foreclosure can have welfare enhancing effects 
as well as welfare reducing effects. Welfare enhancing effects include preventing eliminating 
double marginalisation, eliminating free-riding incentives and reducing hold up problems that 
arise due to incomplete contracts. These are all examples where externalities are internalized. 
Welfare reducing effects other than maintaining monopoly power by foreclosing access are 
reducing inter-brand competition and facilitating collusion. Different effects can occur 
simultaneously (for example exclusion and solving double marginalisation) and have the same 
origin (for example network or scale effects). An assessment of the overall welfare effects of a 
particular strategy needs to take these effects into account. 
 
6 Most Favoured Nation clauses (MFN clauses) are vertical contractual agreements in which the seller (producer) agrees not 
to charge the buyer (retailer) more than the lowest price it charges any other buyer. If the seller sells the product to another 
buyer at a lower price, then he must offer the same price to the buyer who signed the contract with the MFN clause.   19 
2  Theory 
2.1  Introduction 
Until the 1970’s, the U.S. courts were suspicious of vertical restraints such as exclusive 
contracts and vertical integration and prohibited vertical mergers that lead to relatively small 
market shares on the ground that these would exclude potential entrants thereby reducing 
competition.
7 These views were attacked by proponents of the Chicago school who argued that 
a monopolist cannot use exclusive contracts to sustain monopoly profit in the face of efficient 
entry and that vertical integration is not needed to extract the monopoly profit. The argument is 
presented in more detail in textbox ‘The Chicago arguments’ below. They concluded that 
exclusive contracts and vertical integration do not occur for anti-competitive reasons. Instead, 
pointing at potential efficiency gains, they claimed these practises realize efficiencies that 
cannot be achieved otherwise. 
Indeed, when firms are vertically related decisions on commercial strategies that affect the 
joint profits of the whole vertical structure are decentralized. Decisions may therefore be 
inefficient from the viewpoint of the whole vertical structure. Prices may be too high or 
investment in service quality to low. The effect of such inefficiencies may be to lower welfare. 
Internalization of these externalities by means of vertical restraint or vertical integration can 
therefore be beneficial from a welfare point of view. 
Following the advent of game theory, the Chicago arguments were revisited and it was 
shown that under specific circumstances, vertical restraints and vertical integration could serve 
an anti-competitive purpose. In this document, we are mainly interested in an assessment of 
these strategies’ potential to reduce competition or restore market power by foreclosing market 
access. However, when determining the overall effect on welfare of a particular merger or 
vertical constraint, both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects need to be taken into 
account. First we therefore discuss the different welfare enhancing and welfare reducing effects 




7 For example Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US 294 (1962), and Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 407 
(E.D. Mich. 1968) 
8 Bishop et al. (2005) provide an extensive overview of efficiency enhancing effects of vertical integration.   20 
The Chicago arguments 
 
For exclusive contracts the Chicago argument runs as follows. An exclusive contract between a downstream retailer and 
an upstream supplier is entered into voluntarily by both parties. The retailer should therefore be compensated for any 
lost opportunities, including buying from a more efficient supplier. The maximum compensation the upstream supplier 
can offer equals the monopoly profit. However, monopoly pricing leads to a restriction of quantity and a deadweight loss 
relative to a price below the monopoly price. The maximum compensation the upstream supplier can offer is therefore 
less than the surplus gained if exclusive contracts are absent. The supplier is therefore not able to compensate the 
retailer for his lost surplus and the retailer will not sign an exclusive contract if offered. Profitable compensation is only 
possible if exclusive dealing leads to (sufficiently large) efficiency gains. 
 
The Chicago argument for vertical integration claims that a monopolist supplier does not need to integrate in order to 
extract all the product is worth. There is only one monopoly profit to be had and the supplier can already earn it by 
charging an appropriate price in the upstream market. There are no additional profits to be gained by vertical integration. 
Therefore, proponents of the Chicago school again claim, integration is driven by efficiencies that cannot be achieved 
otherwise. 
 
The Chicago argument on exclusive contracts may fail if so-called contracting externalities exist. Such externalities arise 
if the terms of a contract affect the utility of firms that are not a party to the contract. For example, when a supplier and a 
retailer bargain over prices, they do not consider the effect of their agreement on other retailers’ profits. Because of this, 
an upstream monopolist is not able to commit to charging the monopoly price to downstream retailers. 
 
The literature on vertical integration mentions several reasons why the Chicago argument may fail in this case, see 
Church (2004). First, if nonlinear contracts are not feasible, downstream market power leads to double marginalisation 
which prohibits the appropriation of monopoly profits upstream. Second, firms might be able to substitute away from the 
key  input  when  its  supplier  tries  to  exercise  market  power  (for  example  because  downstream  production  involves 
variable proportions), which prohibits the appropriation of monopoly profits by the supplier. Third, the input might be 
used in a variety of different downstream products with varying elasticities. If the supplier is unable to engage in price 
discrimination it cannot charge each user its (user specific) monopoly price. Integration might be a way around this 
problem. Finally, regulation of access to the suppliers’ key input might lead to incentives to vertically integrate or to 
foreclose by means of other anticompetitive strategies such as quality degradation in order to extract monopoly profits. 
 
2.2  Welfare enhancing effects 
2.2.1  Double marginalization 
Double marginalization is a vertical externality that arises because a downstream retailer or an 
upstream supplier’s individually chooses prices that are inefficient from the point of view of a 
vertically integrated entity. This may lead to other inefficiencies, such as inefficient input 
substitution and inefficient investment decisions .  
Double marginalisation occurs when two vertically related firms both have market power. In 
this case the downstream retailer optimizes profits given its marginal costs, which are 
determined by the wholesale price its upstream supplier charges. The supplier in turn optimizes 
profits taking into account that the retailer will charge a mark-up over marginal costs. The   21 
resulting consumer price exceeds the monopoly price. Eliminating double marginalisation 
reduces consumer prices and increases welfare while at the same time raising the combined 
profit of the supplier and the retailer.  
Double marginalisation will not occur if there is fierce competition either downstream or 
upstream. In that case, either the retailer or the supplier cannot charge a mark-up over costs, 
which eliminates double marginalisation. Also if the downstream firm is a durable goods 
monopoly, the effect of double marginalisation is lessened, since the downstream monopolist 
competes with itself.   
Double marginalisation may lead to inefficient input substitution and inefficient investment 
decisions. Inefficient input substitution arises when a mark-up charged by an upstream firm 
causes downstream firms to switch to an alternative input which is produced less efficiently but 
sold with a lower mark-up (Riordan and Salop (1995)). If products are sold in fixed proportions, 
if they are perfect substitutes, or if the level of competition in the  different markets is uniform, 
inefficient input substitution will not occur. 
If firms are not vertically integrated,  the benefits of investments made by a firm at one level 
in the vertical chain may accrue to a firm at another level. This lowers the incentive to invest 
and leads to an inefficient level of investment from the point of view of a vertically integrated 
entity. Suppose an upstream firm can invest to lower its marginal costs. If double 
marginalization exists, it can not appropriate the entire surplus its investment generates. The 
level of investment will therefore be lower than under vertical integration. 
Sufficiently powerful contracts, such as two-part tariffs, resale price maintenance (RPM) 
and quantity forcing, can allow firms to price efficiently and eliminate double marginalisation. 
Two-part tariffs allow the monopolist to fully appropriate the profit of the combined retailer and 
supplier. By using RPM the monopolist can set the retail prices equal to the monopoly price. 
Quantity forcing allows the monopolist to force the retailer to produce the monopoly quantity.  
Different types of contracts are not always substitutable if retailers have different risk 
appetites. Two-part tariffs cause the retailer to price optimally by making it the residual 
claimant, but it also bears all the risk of fluctuations in demand. RPM guarantees a price 
independent of demand, but require a mark-up which depends directly on distribution costs. If 
retailers are risk averse, RPM is preferred under demand uncertainty, whereas two-part tariffs 
are preferred under distribution cost uncertainty (Rey and Tirole (1996)). 
If resale is possible nonlinear contracts enable arbitrage and a supplier is restricted to linear 
contracts. Vertical integration may then still internalise the vertical externality. It may also not 
be possible to fully eliminate inefficiencies if private information exists about costs or demand, 
leading to adverse selection, or about actions such as promotional activities, resulting in moral 
hazard. A contracts then has to address two inefficiencies due to inefficient pricing and private 
information. In general, it will not be possible to fully solve both (see e.g. Martimort and Stole 
(2003)).   22 
2.2.2  Incomplete contracts and hold-up 
Vertical integration and exclusive contracts can solve hold-up problems. A hold-up problem 
may arise when one of the parties to a contract has to make relation a relation specific 
investment that loses its value when the relation is terminated. The possibility of ex post 
opportunistic can then lead to underinvestment. 
Suppose two firms can trade at some future date. Ex ante one of the firms can make a 
relation specific investment that increases the value generated by a future transaction, but the 
terms of this transaction cannot be fixed. Ex post the investments are sunk and bargaining leads 
to a sharing of the surplus generated by the investment. The investing firm can therefore not 
fully appropriate this surplus. Because the firm anticipates ex post opportunism, 
underinvestment results. This is the hold up problem that plays an important role in the 
property-rights theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart (1986), Bolton and Dewatripont, (2005)).  
Vertical integration solves the hold-up problem because an integrated firm appropriates the 
entire surplus generated by its investment. Exclusive territories and exclusive dealing may also 
help avoiding opportunistic behaviour by protecting firm specific investments. However, for 
exclusivity to influence investment incentives, noncontractible investments must affect the 
value of trade with parties outside of the contract (Whinston (2006)). Because the investments 
are assumed to be noncontractible by nature, exclusive contracts can only alter the retailer’s and 
supplier’s disagreement payoff. If the investment only affects the value of the supplier’s and the 
retailer’s trade, exclusive contracts will not affects the incentives to invest. 
2.2.3  Horizontal externalities 
Horizontal externalities occur when free rider opportunities exist between competing retailers or 
producers. If such opportunities exist, the benefits of an investment made by one agent partly 
accrue to another agent, leading to a suboptimal level of investment. In contrast to vertical 
externalities, horizontal externalities exist only if upstream or downstream competition is 
present. 
Spillovers across downstream retailers 
Retailers often provide services that affect the demand for their products: pre-sale advice by 
specially trained personnel, parking facilities, advertising for a specific product etc. If the 
benefits of these services cannot be fully appropriated and spill over to other retailers, provision 
of such services likens the provision of a public good and underinvestment may result. For 
example, if a customer, who has just received extensive advice from a retailer that has invested 
in extensively training personnel, subsequently buys the product more cheaply from a retailer 
who has not invested in such services (and therefore has lower costs), the incentives for making 
such investments are reduced. Vertical restraints, such as exclusive territories or resale price   23 
maintenance, or vertical integration may reduce spillover effects, thereby allowing the retailer 
to appropriate a larger fraction of the benefits generated by the provision of addition services. 
Vertical restraints can either reduce competition between different brands (inter-brand 
competition) or competition between different retailers selling the same brand (intra-brand 
competition). If there is sufficient inter-brand competition, vertical restraints that reduce intra-
brand competition will most likely not harm welfare but enhance firm specific investments.  
Spillovers across upstream suppliers 
A supplier often invests in a retailer in order to increase the sales or lower the distributions costs 
of its brand. Suppliers can for example provide information about potential customers, technical 
support for advertising and promotion, financing to build a retail outlet, sales training for retail 
managers and employees or equipment for servicing and repair (Marvel, (1982)). To the extent 
that these investments also benefit competing brands sold by the same retailer, other suppliers 
can free ride on them. This induces an externalities between brands sold by the same retailer. 
Exclusive dealing may prohibit this kind of free-riding by excluding other brands from the 
retailer’s outlet. 
Besanko and Perry (1993) formalize this idea and study the effect and adoption of exclusive 
dealing in a differentiated products oligopoly with vertical externalities. They identify two 
opposing effects when there is an oligopoly both upstream and downstream. On the one hand, 
exclusive dealing eliminates spillovers and allows individual suppliers to appropriate the 
benefits of their investments. On the other hand, promotional investments are a form of 
competition between suppliers. Eliminating spillovers might therefore reduce profits by leading 
to more fierce competition in promotional investments. As a consequence in equilibrium 
exclusive dealing is not necessarily adopted. Suppliers may find it beneficial to maintain the 
externality, because it softens competition. Besanko and Perry find that due to exclusive 
dealing, investments and wholesale prices increase. Also, as exclusive dealing becomes more 
prevalent, industry output increases whereas retail prices decrease. Consumers therefore prefer 
more exclusive dealing to less. 
2.2.4  Competition and investment 
A firm engaging in anticompetitive vertical foreclosure increases its market power and reduces 
competition. Market power and competition affect firms’ incentives to invest. The effect of 
reduced competition and increased market power on investment is, however, ambiguous.  
 
On the one hand, a firm with market power can appropriate a larger fraction of the surplus its 
investments, (through new products or lower costs) generate for consumers than firms without 
market power. This is called the surplus appropriation or Schumpeterian effect. As an example, 
consider a market with a non-integrated firm owning a network and many downstream retailers.   24 
Assume the monopolist can increase demand by significant investments in its network. If the 
monopolist cannot restrict access, it faces a commitment problem with many downstream 
retailers. This then leads to an access price close to marginal costs. Profits will be too low to 
recoup the initial investment. If the monopolist cannot (partially) restore its market power, the 
investment will not take place. Exclusive contracts or vertical integration are a way to restore 
market power and the profitability of the investment.  
On the other hand incumbents have less of an incentive to innovate than entrants, because 
new products eat into its existing profits from old products. This is known as the Arrow 
replacement effect. In addition, competition selects the most efficient companies and creates 
incentives to increase productivity (Boone (2000)). These effects cause an increase in 
competition to increase investment or innovation. 
Generally, the relation between competition and innovation is expected to be an inverted-U 
shape (Aghion et al. (2005)). Depending on the level of competition, the relation between 
competition and innovation may be positive or negative. Restoring market power through 
foreclosure (thereby reducing competition) may therefore either increase or decrease a firm’s 
incentives to invest or to innovate. For example, in the famous Microsoft case, the effect of 
restricting the use of exclusionary practises on investment is an important point of discussion 
(Schmalensee (2000)). Although the short run effects of such a restriction might be to expand 
choice for consumers, in the long run it ‘may make entry easier, but the reward to success 
smaller.’ (Whinston (2001)). 
Based on theoretical arguments, a negative relationship between competition and innovation 
may be expected in markets with several of the following characteristics: low marginal and high 
fixed costs, intensive use of labour and human capital, network effects, competition for the 
market (winner-takes-all-race) and very profitable market leaders (Evans and Schmalensee 
(2000), Canton (2002)). 
2.2.5  Too much entry 
If entry involves fixed costs, competition can result in too much entry. On the one hand, if new 
firms enter the market, increased competition will lower prices and increase consumer welfare. 
On the other hand this gain has come at a cost: the fixed cost of entry. Entry is socially optimal 
if the gains from entry are larger than the costs. However, a firm will enter the market if its 
expected profits are larger than the costs of entry. Part of its profit will be generated by 
customers that switch away from other firms (the so-called business stealing effect). Thus, entry 
may be privately profitable even though it is socially wasteful because the fixed costs of entry 
outweigh the subsequent increase in total welfare (Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Rey and 
Tirole (2003)). Foreclosure can prevent this welfare lowering effect by limiting entry, even 
though entry is profitable from an entrant’s perspective. However, nothing guarantees that a 
firm with market power will restrict entry to the socially optimal level.   25 
2.3  Welfare reducing effects 
For completeness sake, we briefly discuss two anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints and 
vertical integration other than welfare reducing foreclosure: reducing inter-brand competition 
and facilitating collusion. Inter-brand competition occurs when different brands compete. Intra-
brand competition occurs when different retailers selling the same brand compete.  
2.3.1  Softening competition 
Upstream suppliers can reduce inter-brand competition by means of vertical restraints if these 
allow the supplier to delegate strategic decisions to downstream agents, thereby committing the 
upstream supplier not to compete fiercely.  
As an example, consider two suppliers that both sell to two retailers. The retailers compete 
in prices and the two products are differentiated. Without exclusive contracts, both retailers sell 
both products. Due to intra-brand competition downstream the retail price for each product 
equals the retailer’s marginal costs. Suppliers then compete more or less directly with each 
other, as if they were vertically integrated.  
Exclusive contracts (for example exclusive territories) eliminate intra-brand competition. 
The retailer selling the one supplier’s product will now compete with the retailer selling the 
other supplier’s product. If the one supplier now raises it prices, this will only indirectly affect 
the other supplier’s profits. Downstream retailers now function more or less as a cushion, 
softening competition between the upstream suppliers (Rey and Stiglitz (1995), Caillaud and 
Rey (1995)).
9 
2.3.2  Facilitating collusion 
Successful explicit or tacit collusion requires that colluding firms can agree on a collusive 
strategy, that deviations from this strategy can be detected and that deviators can be punished. If 
any one of these conditions is not satisfied, unilaterally deviating from the collusive equilibrium 
is profitable and collusion unsustainable. Resale price maintenance (RPM) has been suggested 
to facilitate collusion by allowing deviations to be detected more easily, by leading to more 
uniform retail prices (Mathewson and Winter (1998), Julien and Rey (2000)).  
 
Vertical integration has been argued to facilitate collusion. If vertical integration leads to 
customer foreclosure, it reduces the incentives of upstream rivals to defect from the cartel 
agreement because their potential market share is reduced. This means there is less to gain for 
deviators. In addition, a vertically integrated firm does not have to renegotiate supply contracts 
before punishing deviations from the collusive strategy (Nocke and White (2005)).  
 
9 This effect is not robust to the type of downstream competition. If retailers compete à la Cournot, suppliers delegating their 
sales to independent retailers intensify competition. Delegating retail activities has no commitment effect if contracts are 
unobservable and the retailer and the supplier face no contracting restrictions and have symmetric information.    26 
Common agency can also facilitate collusion. In particular, if upstream suppliers choose a 
common downstream retailer, they will be able to charge joint profit maximizing prices at 
equilibrium, even when they do not delegate pricing decisions to downstream retailers but use 
RPM to set downstream prices (Bernheim and Whinston (1985)). Rey and Vergé (2002) show 
that this result may also holds in case of a bilateral duopoly. 
2.4  Foreclosure and monopoly 
We now turn to foreclosure and its potential to reduce competition or restore market power. 
Foreclosure is a direct consequence of an exclusive contract. As a natural starting point for our 
discussion we therefore focus on such contracts. Nevertheless, other types of vertical restraints 
may also lead to foreclosure, such as using a specific instead of a generic technology, or 
nonexclusive vertical contracts that change upstream pricing incentives such as RPM or Most 
favoured nation (MFN) clauses. 
Whinston (2006) defines an exclusive contract as follows: ‘An exclusive contract states that 
one party to the contract will only deal with the other party for some set of transactions’. For 
example, a wholesale supplier and a retailer might enter into a contract excluding other 
suppliers from selling through that particular retailer. Consequently, these suppliers are 
foreclosed from serving the market through this particular retailer. Alternatively, a retailer 
might enter into a contract with a supplier excluding other retailers from selling goods 
manufactured by that supplier. These retailers are then foreclosed from serving that particular 
supplier’s goods to the market. 
Starting from the premise that market power exists either upstream or downstream, a theory of 
foreclosure should show that foreclosure is an equilibrium strategy. Of course the next question 
should be: what are the welfare consequences of foreclosure? 
10 In this chapter, we will concern 
ourselves with the first question. Answering the second question requires an assessment of the 
presence and magnitude of both welfare decreasing and welfare increasing effects.  
 
10 These are similar to the three steps proposed by the EC in their draft guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal 
mergers, (1) ability to foreclose (2) incentive to foreclose and (3) impact on effective competition.   27 
Input foreclosure versus customer foreclosure 
It is common (see e.g. EC, 2007) to distinguish two types of vertical foreclosure: input 
foreclosure and customer foreclosure. Input foreclosure arises when an upstream firm (also 
called ‘producer’ or ‘supplier’ or ‘manufacturer’) either refuses to supply a downstream firm 
(also called ‘retailer’ or ‘seller’) or raises the price of its input, while a competing retailer is 
supplied or provided input at a lower price. This increases the profit of the competing retailer. 
The producer might engage in this type of exclusionary behaviour if it expects that it can 
appropriate some of the additional gains resulting from the increased profits of the advantaged 
retailer. Input foreclosure might for instance occur through a vertical (exclusive) contract 
between the producer and the retailer, or because the producer vertically integrates with this 
retailer (in which case the advantaged retailer is a subsidiary of the producer itself).  
While input foreclosure involves harming a downstream competitor, customer foreclosure 
amounts to a downstream retailer buying from one producer, but refusing to buy supplies from 
competing upstream producers. This reduces the demand for the upstream competitor’s 
products. Under the assumption that this increases the competitor’s marginal costs or induces 
exit, customer foreclosure reduces the competitive pressure on the upstream producer. The 
downstream retailer may benefit from such a strategy if it can appropriate some of the upstream 
producer’s additional gains. 
The simplest situation 
We can illustrate the various types of foreclosure, and analyse the conditions in which they 
might occur, by focussing first on the simplest, ‘triangular’ situation in which there are three 
firms, either two producers and one retailer, or two retailers and one producer (see figure 1). In 
first instance, we assume that the retailer has all the market power and makes take-it-or-leave-it 
offers to the suppliers A and B. 
Figure 2.1           downstream and upstream monopoly 
Supplier A Supplier B
Retailer 
Supplier 
Retailer 1 Retailer 2
 
Downstream monopoly 
To see the Chicago argument at work, consider a situation where a monopolist retailer buys an 
upstream good from two symmetric competitive manufacturers, depicted in the panel on the left   28 
hand side in figure 2.1. The central question is whether the retailer has an incentive to engage in 
customer foreclosure of one of the manufacturers, in order to reduce upstream competition (i.e. 
to engage in customer foreclosure). The answer is clearly no: the retailer can control the 
quantities it buys from either manufacturer, and restrict them to supply the monopoly quantity. 
If the upstream goods are homogeneous and marginal production costs are constant, this implies 
that the monopolist would conclude contracts with both manufacturers that in aggregate add up 
to the monopoly quantity. In this case any distribution of this aggregate quantity would do. All 
rents would be appropriated by the monopolist.
11 
This argument remains valid if we look at it from the point of view of the manufacturers, 
where these two make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the monopoly retailer (Bernheim and 
Whinston, 1998). In this case, Bernheim and Whinston show that the monopoly profit can be 
realised using a simple two-part tariff consisting of a wholesale price and a fixed fee. Again, 
customer foreclosure would appear to give the exclusive manufacturer monopoly leverage over 
the retailer (since his upstream competitor has been excluded from the market). However, since 
the upstream manufacturers A and B compete over being the exclusive supplier, these rents are 
dissipated (i.e. left to the retailer), and the manufacturer can only extract a profit insofar as his 
product has higher value (or lower cost) than his rival’s, as claimed by the Chicago School 
critics. If optimal supplies (in terms of the aggregate profits of retailer and manufacturers) 
involve supplies from both manufacturers to the retailer - which would be the case for instance 
if the upstream goods are differentiated, or if there are diseconomies of scale in production - 
then both manufacturers can do strictly better if they do not resort to exclusivity, but instead 
supply their share of the optimal quantities. For homogeneous goods and constant marginal 
production costs, on the other hand, the monopolist would appropriate all rents and conclude 
contracts with both manufacturers that in aggregate add up to the monopoly quantity. 
Upstream monopoly 
The story changes - and the Chicago argument breaks down - if we consider the reverse 
industry structure: the case of a monopolist producer, and a retail duopoly, depicted in the panel 
on the right hand side in figure 2.1. In this case input foreclosure might take place, in which the 
monopoly producer only supplies one of the retailers, say retailer 1 (or, more generally, supplies 
the other retailer, i.e. retailer 2, at less favourable conditions), in order to decrease competition 
in the downstream market. The rationale for this would be to increase total downstream profits, 
which the monopolist could appropriate through its contract with retailer 1. 
A valid question is whether exclusion is necessary to achieve this goal: again, at first sight, the 
Chicago argument suggests it is not. Since the monopolist controls all (upstream) production, it 
could be expected to distribute exactly that output that maximises total industry profits (e.g. the 
 
11 The indeterminacy results from the assumption of constant marginal costs. In contrast, if marginal costs are increasing, 
the retailer would prefer to buy exactly half of the monopoly quantity from either manufacturer, in order to minimise 
production costs. With decreasing marginal costs, the monopolist would buy from one producer only.   29 
monopoly output if the retailers’ final goods are homogeneous). Given its monopoly position it 
would then, through its supply contracts, extract these profits from the competing retailers. 
Whether it singles out one retailer for serving consumers, or makes use of the services of both, 
should not matter in the homogeneous good case. 
However, as pointed out by Hart and Tirole (1999), see also Rey and Tirole (2006), the 
monopolist may fail to maximise total industry profits, in spite of its pivotal position in the 
industry, as a consequence of a commitment problem. While bargaining with either retailer, the 
monopolist would recognise that it can increase its joint profits with that retailer at the expense 
of the other retailer. In a hypothetical equilibrium in which the monopolist supplies half the 
monopoly quantity to the one retailers, the other retailer and the supplier can increase their 
combined profit by selling an additional quantity. While this decreases total industry profits 
(since these are maximised for the monopoly quantity), it would be the other retailer bearing the 
costs (as a result of lower final market prices). The manufacturer and the deviating retailer 
jointly increase their earnings (and can distribute these gains through the contract they 
conclude).
12 
Of course, either retailer would anticipate such opportunistic behaviour by the manufacturer 
and would not be willing to sign the initial contract. Instead, optimal contracts in this case turn 
out to involve duopoly quantities and prices, even though production is controlled by a 
monopolist. To see this, note that the monopolist optimizes joint profit with each retailer 
separately. Therefore, for a given quantity produced by retailer 1 (retailer 2), it will react by 
contracting the optimal quantity with retailer 2 (retailer 1). In equilibrium, the optimal reaction 
to its contract with retailer 1 (retailer 2) should be the contract with retailer 2 (retailer 1). This is 
exactly the equilibrium condition in a Cournot duopoly. 
Explicit foreclosure through an exclusive sales contract in this case does provide additional 
value for the monopolist
13: the contract allows it to commit not to sell (opportunistically) to the 
retailer’s rival. Unlike in the above example of customer foreclosure, here the Chicago School 
argument breaks down, and exclusive contracts are means to effectively monopolise the 
consumer market. Vertical integration is another means of committing not to deliver. If the 
upstream monopolist integrates with one of the downstream retailers, it effectively internalises 
the effects of any opportunistic behaviour. Other vertical restraints such as RPM can be 
interpreted analogously. 
 
12 Note that this requires that the contract offers are not publicly observable. If contracts are publicly observable, whether or 
not the Chicago result holds depends on the distribution of bargaining power. If the supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
the monopoly profit can still be realized and the Chicago result remains valid. If the retailers make take-it-or-leave-it, the 
Chicago result fails because each retailer has an incentive to free-ride on the other retailers’ revenues, see Rey et al. 
(2006).  
13 Provided the downstream market is sufficiently homogeneous.   30 
Passive, active and wary beliefs 
When  the  upstream  monopolist  makes  secret  offers  to  competing  retailers,  the  equilibrium  outcome  depends  on 
retailers’ conjectures or beliefs about the contract offered to its rivals. These are the beliefs of retailers when they 
receive an offer from the supplier about the offer received by other retailers. Hart and Tirole (1990) assume so-called 
passive  beliefs:  the  retailer  receiving  a  deviating  offer  believes  that  the  other  retailers  are  still  being  offered  their 
equilibrium contracts. The supplier is then faced with the commitment problem described above. McAfee and Schwartz 
(1994) point out that under so-called active beliefs the commitment problem disappears. Under active beliefs a retailer 
receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer assumes that its competitors receive the same deviating offer. In this case, the 
supplier can credibly commit to charging the monopoly price. Rey and Verge (2004) consider a third variant and assume 
so-called wary beliefs. These imply that retailers’ beliefs are consistent with the suppliers’ incentives. A retailer offered a 
particular contract believes that given the out-of-equilibrium offer received the supplier offers optimal contracts to the 
other retailers. Under wary beliefs, the commitment problem survives, but is less severe.  
 
Allowing the monopolist to offer a menu of contracts, Segal and Whinston (2003) derive general conditions, independent 
of the beliefs held by retailers, for an equilibrium of the bidding game of retailers and suppliers to exist. They show that 
this equilibrium converges to the competitive outcome if the number of firms becomes large. Thus, if there are many 
retailers, the commitment problem leads to a competitive equilibrium, no matter what beliefs retailers hold. 
 
Contracting externalities 
The underlying reason for the difference between the two scenarios was analysed by Bernheim 
and Whinston (1998). They conclude that a necessary condition for exclusive contracts to be 
optimal when exercising market power is that the profits of at least one of the duopolists, given 
the contract it has concluded with the monopolist, should depend directly on the contract the 
monopolist concludes with its rival. Such dependence is referred to as a contracting externality.  
In the example of customer foreclosure (i.e. two upstream retailers and one downstream 
monopolist), given the contract a retailer has concluded with the monopolist, either 
manufacturer will be indifferent to the contract written with its rival. Total profits are only 
decided by the price structure agreed upon in the contract, its own production costs, and the 
quantity it chooses to sell. In contrast, in the second case of input foreclosure, either retailer’s 
profits depend not only on its own costs and contract with the manufacturer, but also on the 
price in the downstream market. This price is affected in turn by the (contracted) sales of the 
manufacturer to the rival retailer. The dependence of one retailer’s profits on the contract 
between the manufacturer and the other retailer is a contracting externality, and opens the 
possibility that an exclusive contract is profitable. 
The firm’s response to externalities 
Contracting externalities lead to scope for opportunism on the part of the monopolist: it has an 
incentive to extract profits from one contract party when bargaining with a competitor. In effect, 
the monopolist treats the retailers as if they were active in separate markets, even if the retailers 
experience a strong interdependency. In response, the firm’s contracting parties, anticipating   31 
such opportunistic behaviour, will behave more cautiously, preventing optimal (from the point 
of view of an integrated structure) exercise of market power. 
Various strategies are available to the monopolist to resolve this problem and restore its 
market power. Clearly, such strategies should aim at reducing the scope for opportunism on the 
part of the monopolist, and allow it to commit not to expropriate its contracting partner instead. 
One form of commitment is through contracts: the monopolist may contractually bind itself 
to certain behaviour regarding its sales to the competing agent. One simple such contract is an 
exclusive sales contract, which specifies that no sales at all are made to the competitor (but no 
pricing structure is specified). In this case foreclosure is complete. In some cases the monopolist 
may sacrifice some efficiency by writing such simple exclusive contracts. For example, if both 
downstream retailers are differentiated, then the highest total industry profits would involve 
some sales through both retailers, and exclusion leads to strictly lower aggregate profits. In this 
case it would be preferable if parties could specify total sales to both retailers more precisely 
(such contractual terms may prove harder to verify however). 
A second, in some way more flexible, solution already mentioned above would be vertical 
integration. If the monopolist integrates with one of the agents, it will internalise any 
externalities vis-a-vis this agent in its contracting behaviour with the competitor. Take again the 
example of the two competing retailers: vertical integration with retailer 1 would take away its 
incentives to oversell the market through retailer 2. It would then cut in its own profits through 
its downstream subsidiary. In case of differentiated downstream goods, the monopolist could 
even sell positive quantity (though not necessary the optimal quantity) to retailer 2. 
Vertical agreements such as RPM and MFN-clauses can also be viewed as means of 
committing not to deliver opportunistically to a retailer’s downstream rivals at lower prices. For 
example, RPM (whereby the retail price for all retailers is set by the manufacturer instead of the 
retailer) allows the manufacturer to set the retail price close to the wholesale price, thereby 
internalising effects of selling additional quantities through other retailers. 
Finally, as discussed by Rey and Tirole (2006), regulation may help the monopolist to 
commit. For example, if regulation forces the monopolist to make non-discriminatory offers, it 
can use this restraint on its behaviour to commit to refraining from disadvantaging either 
retailer. In this case, the agents’ observation of any offer they receive gives them, by the non-
discrimination requirement, the information on their competitor’s offer. Thus in a way non-
discrimination clauses force so-called active beliefs (discussed in the textbox ‘Passive, active 
and wary beliefs’ above) upon the retailers. In this situation, the monopolist could for instance 
offer half the monopoly quantity to either player, and extract full monopoly rents from them. 
Downstream Bertrand competition 
The commitment problem discussed above was first identified by Hart and Tirole (1990) for 
downstream Cournot competition. Under downstream Bertrand competition with differentiated   32 
products the commitment problem persists, but with an additional twist (O’Brien and Shaffer 
(1992), Rey and Vergé (2004)). Consider an upstream supplier contracting with two 
downstream retailers. For simplicity we restrict ourselves to a two part tariff consisting of a 
fixed and a variable part. The upstream supplier chooses the variable part to optimize its joint 
profit with retailer 1, assuming the contract with retailer 2 to be fixed.
14 Under Cournot 
competition a change in the variable price charged to retailer 1 affects the bilateral profit of 
retailer 1 and the upstream supplier in the usual way: the total quantity sold changes and the 
price-cost mark-up changes. If these were the only effects on bilateral profits under Bertrand 
competition, the results from Cournot competition would straightforwardly carry over to the 
Bertrand case. In equilibrium the supplier would charge a variable fee equal to its upstream 
marginal costs and both firms would charge duopoly prices (instead of producing the duopoly 
quantities). However, a change in the wholesale price charged to the one retailer also affects the 
market share of the other retailer. Under Cournot competition, retailer 1 and the supplier 
optimize their joint profits assuming that the quantity produced by retailer 2 is fixed. Therefore 
under Cournot competition this indirect effect does not influence the variable price set by the 
upstream supplier. Under Bertrand competition prices instead of quantities are the strategic 
variables and the indirect effect on the quantity produced by retailer 2 is taken into account 
when optimizing the variable fee.
15  
To identify a possible equilibrium, note that for the quantity sold to retailer 2 the supplier 
earns the variable fee minus the supplier’s marginal costs. If the variable fee equals the 
suppliers’ marginal costs, the indirect effect disappears: changes in retailer 2’s market share 
then do not affect the bilateral profit because the profit margin on an extra unit sold to retailer 2 
is zero. Therefore, the equilibrium in the absence of this effect (with the upstream transfer price 
equal to marginal costs and downstream prices equal to the Bertrand duopoly prices) is still a 
candidate for the equilibrium in the case of Bertrand competition (O’Brien and Shaffer (1992)). 
In some cases, this is indeed the equilibrium. However, for passive beliefs, it turns out that 
the candidate equilibrium is not a maximum if the cross-price elasticity is at least half the own 
price elasticity. In this case, profitable deviations that involve changing both contracts at the 
same time are possible and an equilibrium does not exist. Rey and Vergé (2004) address this 
problem by assuming so-called wary beliefs (discussed in textbox ‘Passive, active and wary 
beliefs’ above). These imply that a retailer’s beliefs are consistent with the supplier’s 
incentives. If one retailer is offered a particular contract, it believes that the producer offers the 
other retailers’ optimal contracts given this particular offer.
16 They show that under wary 
beliefs, an equilibrium always exists. It shows that the commitment problem is robust and does 
not critically depend on particular beliefs held by retailers or the type of competition.  
 
14 The retailers have passive beliefs. 
15 This indirect effect is similar to the ‘collusive’ effect identified by Chen (2001) and the ‘accommodation’ effect identified by 
Bourreau et al. (2007) in oligopolistic markets. These papers will be discussed below. 
16 Under Cournot competition and unobservability of contracts, wary and passive beliefs are equivalent.   33 
Linear contracts 
Nonlinear contracts specify a specific transfer for every quantity sold. In general, the relation between quantity and 
transfer is nonlinear, as for example in the case of a two part tariff. Linear contracts specify a constant price per unit 
quantity. For these contracts the relation between transfer and quantity is linear. 
 
In some situations, general nonlinear contracts may not be feasible. If goods are (easily) tradable, nonlinear contracts 
give rise to arbitrage opportunities and will therefore not be used. Suppliers will instead write linear contracts. Also, in 
the presence of information asymmetry fully general non-linear contracts might not be feasible. Incentive compatibility 
constraints then restrict the contracts that can be offered (see Martimort and Stole (2003)). 
 
If foreclosure is not optimal when non-linear contracts can be written, it can still be profitable if the available contracts 
are  constrained,  in  particular  when  only  linear  contract  are  available.  If  contracts  are  constrained  to  be  linear,  a 
manufacturer cannot extract all that its product is worth and it might not be possible to optimize joint profit. For example, 
in the case of downstream and upstream market power double marginalisation prevents the monopoly profit to be 
realised. Matthewson and Winters (1987) find that exclusion can be profitable if contracts are restricted to be linear, in 
sharp contrast with findings by for example O’Brien and Shaffer (1997) or Bernheim and Whinston (1998). However in 
Matthewson and Winters (1987), foreclosure will often not be credible, as noted by Church (2004). In most cases, it will 
be profit-maximizing for the integrated firm to sell the product of its non-integrated upstream competitor. 
 
2.5  Foreclosure and bilateral oligopoly 
Up to now, we have been mainly concerned with foreclosure by a single upstream or 
downstream monopolist. However, in many markets where upstream or downstream market 
power exists, both upstream and downstream markets are oligopolistic (a so-called bilateral 
oligopoly). In these markets, in addition to downstream retailers also upstream suppliers may be 
foreclosed. This so-called customer foreclosure is qualitatively different from input foreclosure. 
The question is how the analysis of foreclosure in markets with an upstream or downstream 
monopoly generalizes to bilateral oligopolies. In addition to the ones already mentioned in 
paragraph 2.4, the following additional issue now arise: (3) If foreclosure is an equilibrium 
strategy, to what extent are the exclusive contract’s terms affected by upstream competition? 
An important feature in bilateral oligopolies is their level of vertical integration. As argued 
in the previous section, if there exists a monopoly upstream or downstream, vertical integration 
can be a strategy to protect monopoly power from the commitment problem that arises in the 
face of downstream competition. 
We consider three broad types of market structures differing in their level of vertical 
integration. The first type, depicted on the left hand side in figure 2.2 below, consists of an 
oligopoly both upstream and downstream and no vertical integration. The second market 
structure, depicted in the middle of figure 2.2, is similar to the first except that one of both 
vertical pairs has integrated into one vertical entity, consisting of an upstream and a 
downstream division. How does vertical integration influence the integrated firm’s incentive to 
supply non-integrated downstream rivals? In particular, does the integrated firm have an   34 
incentive to foreclose access or “raise its downstream rival’s costs”? The final configuration, 
depicted on the right hand side in figure 2.2, has three firms at the downstream level and two 
firms at the upstream level that are vertically integrated with two of the downstream firms.
17 
When is it optimal for the vertically integrated firms to exclude the downstream retailer? 
Figure 2.2          Three market structures with bilateral oligopoly, and vertical integration 
Supplier A Supplier B
Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3
Supplier A Supplier B






2.5.1  Bilateral oligopoly without vertical integration  
We first focus on the first panel in figure 2.1, the case of oligopoly up- and downstream, 
without vertical ownership ties. Here the theoretical literature is much less systematically 
developed than in the previously considered ‘triangular’ market structures. Although full 
understanding of this (practically relevant) case is lacking, some insights about the general 
picture may be gleaned from specific case analyses. In discussing such insights we again 
distinguish two types of foreclosure through exclusive contracts, input foreclosure (where a 
supplier refuses to deal with a particular retailer) and customer foreclosure (where a retailer 
commits not to buy from a particular supplier).  
Input foreclosure 
The case of input foreclosure is not substantially different from the upstream monopoly case. 
For that market structure, we found that input foreclosure is a response to a commitment 
problem by a supplier wishing to use his market power. By contractually excluding sales to a 
rival retailer, the supplier solves the problem that his sales to this rival would damage the first 
retailer’s profits. 
Clearly, if upstream suppliers have significant market power (e.g. because their products are 
substantially differentiated, or because one supplier has a significant cost advantage over his 
upstream rivals), the same argument as in the monopoly case continues to hold and exclusive 
contracts remain an equilibrium.  
 
17 Of course there also exist market structures with partial integration. Supermarkets and their suppliers are an example with 
more than two upstream and downstream firms that are not vertically integrated. Cement production and building activities, 
brewers and pubs in the UK are examples with more than two upstream and downstream firms and partial vertical 
integration.   35 
In contrast, without significant market power there is no reason for exclusion. Bertrand 
competition among upstream suppliers leads to the lowest (marginal) cost firm supplying the 
retailers at a price equal to the runner-up supplier’s costs (see e.g. Ordover et al., 1990, or Chen, 
2001, Hart and Tirole, 1990). Foreclosure is in such cases not an issue. 
To see this switch from no foreclosure to foreclosure as market power increases, consider 
the case where one supplier has a cost advantage over his rival supplier, and both may sell their 
goods to a Cournot retailer duopoly. Can an exclusive contract be optimal for the efficient 
supplier if there is a bypass opportunity through the less efficient supplier? In this case, the 
excluded downstream firm and the inefficient supplier would jointly produce the best response 
to the (low-cost) exclusive combination’s supplies, and the market outcome would be the 
asymmetric cost Cournot equilibrium. If as we assumed, upstream firms make the offers, they 
will appropriate the profits. For the efficient supplier, the trade-off is therefore between 
producing twice the symmetric Cournot quantities if it writes a common contract, and 
compensating the retailers for their outside options (which is buying from the inefficient 
supplier), as shown by Hart and Tirole (1990), or producing the asymmetric Cournot quantity if 
it writes an exclusive contract (and again compensating the exclusive retailer for not buying 
from the inefficient supplier). Clearly, in the limit that the bypass supplier is very inefficient an 
exclusive contract is optimal. The presence of the inefficient supplier then does not limit the 
terms of contract the efficient supplier can offer. If both suppliers are equally efficient, they will 
be indifferent between the two types of contract. Both exclusive as well as common contracts 
then yield zero profit. For a small efficiency gap a common contract is optimal. The common 
profit is then roughly twice the exclusive profit.  
We saw in the monopoly case that banning price discrimination might be welfare reducing, 
since it allows the monopolist to commit not to behave opportunistically and sell only the 
monopoly quantity through both retailers, rather than the duopoly quantity. Interestingly, in the 
presence of the inefficient bypass opportunity this result need not hold anymore (Caprice, 
2006). In bargaining with the efficient supplier, retailers have the outside option of accepting 
the inefficient supplier’s offer. A lower variable price reduces the value from this outside 
option, allowing the supplier to extract more bargaining surplus through a fixed fee. In 
equilibrium this leads the efficient supplier to reduce its variable price component below 
marginal costs (thereby increasing output). While in this way total industry profits are reduced, 
the share that the monopolist receives will be larger. 
Customer foreclosure 
For the case of customer foreclosure, there is a qualitatively new aspect compared to the retailer 
monopoly situation analysed in the previous section. For a monopoly retailer, customer 
foreclosure is no equilibrium since the single retailer can perfectly coordinate sales from all   36 
competing suppliers, achieving the joint profit maximising outcome for the whole sector. There 
are no contracting externalities, in short. 
This is no longer true for the case of multiple up and downstream players. If the contracting 
choices of a retailer impact intensity of competition between suppliers, one retailer’s 
contracting choices affects his rival’s opportunities: a contracting externality is introduced. 
To illustrate this effect, we start the analysis with a situation which is close to the upstream 
monopoly case studied in the previous sector. Assume now that in addition to the upstream 
monopolist, there is a second upstream firm that may enter the industry. We might say that 
upstream, there is ‘almost a duopoly’. Following Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and 
Whinston (2000), in this situation the monopolist, having a first mover advantage, may use 
exclusive contracting with its downstream customers to deter entry of its upstream rival (see 
also Whinston, 2006, for a discussion). 
Downstream customers of the upstream firm would all benefit from the entry of the second 
upstream firm, as this would introduce fiercer competition upstream (and hence higher 
downstream rents). If they expect the second upstream firm to enter they would not be easily 
enticed to sign an exclusive agreement, except at a price which reflects the higher upstream 
competition.  
Suppose now, however, that there are economies of scale: the upstream firm can only enter 
profitably if it succeeds in contracting with multiple downstream firms. This may for instance 
be the result of fixed entry costs. If all but one downstream firms sign an exclusive contract 
with the incumbent, entry would not take place. In this case, clearly it would be beneficial to 
downstream firms to coordinate and avoid ending up with monopoly. There is however now a 
contracting externality between firms: any firm not signing up to an exclusive contract with the 
incumbent creates positive benefit for the other downstream firms. If contracting occurs 
bilaterally between the monopolist and the downstream firms, individual retailers do not take 
this externality into account in when accepting or rejecting a contract. The monopolist can then 
use the externality and exclusive contracts may result. 
To see this result, more clearly suppose the benefit of upstream entry to each downstream 
firm is b. The upstream firm may now offer (slightly more than) b to all but one firm (which 
they would accept) and extract the monopoly price from the last firm (who cannot on its own 
induce upstream entry). It can even do better than that by approaching the downstream firms 
sequentially: if the first firm approached declines the offer of (slightly less than) the monopoly 
price, the incumbent may threaten to offer all following downstream firms a contract including 
payment b, making the initial firm worse off. In equilibrium, all downstream firms accept the 
contract at negligible cost to the incumbent
18  
 
18 Conditions under which this costless (to the incumbent) exclusion can occur in general are derived by Segal and Whinston 
(2003).    37 
The results of this model are modified if all downstream agents compete as retailers in the same 
market. If downstream competition is fierce, a firm achieving lower input costs can attract large 
volumes of final sales. Because market demand is diverted to low cost retailers, economies of 
scale are realised through contracting with one individual retailer. In the extreme case, 
contracting with even a single retailer can be enough for an entrant to profitably enter the 
market. The first mover advantage will then be less relevant (Fumagalli and Motta, 2002). 
However, if retailers can pass on the higher costs of monopoly to their customers, their 
incentives to contract with the entrant may be reduced. 
Exclusive contracting may therefore occur as a strategy to prevent entry by rivals. It requires 
that the entrant needs contracts with multiple customers as a result of economies of scale. In this 
case the incumbent’s strategy is to make sure that at no moment in time enough contracts to 
make entry possible are up for renewal. 
Although formally less well analysed, it may be imagined that a similar strategy continuous 
to be viable if there is no first-mover advantage by the incumbent, so that both suppliers are 
present in the (first) contracting stage (Whinston, 2006). The basic requirement is that one 
supplier can benefit from a lack of coordination on the part of retailers, and execute a strategy 
of ‘divide and conquer’ (Inderst and Mazzarotta, 2006). 
Linear contracts 
Some models look specifically at situations where suppliers can only conclude linear contracts. Besanko and Perry 
(1994) study the effects of exclusive dealing in a model with multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers, where two 
symmetric manufacturers sell differentiated brands to retailers (charging linear prices) and the retailers are spatially 
differentiated (a Hotelling type of model with consumers on a circle). There is free entry by symmetric retailers. Without 
exclusive  dealing,  retailers  carry  both  brands.  With  exclusive  dealing,  they  carry  only  one  brand.  By  assumption, 
manufacturers cannot sign exclusive contracts with all sellers. Therefore, neither manufacturer is ever excluded from the 
market.  They  find  that  under  exclusive  dealing  manufacturer  profits  are  higher,  providing  an  incentive  to  insist  on 
exclusive contracts. Exclusive dealing also leads to higher prices and higher transportation costs for consumers. In the 
case of exclusivity, increased retail entry due to higher prices and lower fixed costs (inventory and store space) result in 
ambiguous welfare effects. 
 
2.5.2  Bilateral oligopoly with vertical integration 
In this section, we consider the incentive to foreclose in markets with a bilateral oligopoly and 
partial vertical integration. Vertical integration changes the incentives of a firm producing a key 
input, by internalizing the effects of its wholesale price setting on the profits of its downstream 
affiliate. The literature on the potential pro- and anti-competitive effects of vertical integration 
has been discussed extensively in recent review papers by Church (2004) and Bishop et al. 
(2005). We will focus on the implications for theories of foreclosure. 
Again, it is common to distinguish between two different types of foreclosure. Input 
foreclosure arises when post-merger the integrated firm raises the price for its product in the 
upstream market, or completely withdraws from this market. Customer foreclosure arises when   38 
post-merger the integrated firm no longer buys input from upstream competitors. However, with 
bilateral oligopoly, the two can not easily be separated. If post-merger a vertically integrated 
firm withdraws from the wholesale market, it no longer sells in the upstream market, which 
implies input foreclosure, but at the same time it also no longer buys in the upstream market, 
which implies customer foreclosure. 
Consider a market with two upstream supplier, where the one supplier is more efficient 
(lower marginal costs) than the other, and two downstream retailers. We saw in section 2.4 that 
without integration and in the absence of exclusive contracts, the efficient upstream firm in 
aggregate supplies the Cournot duopoly quantity divided between both retail channels. In 
contrast, if exclusion is optimal, outcomes would involve some production by the inefficient 
supplier who then supplies the remaining unintegrated downstream retailer (Hart and 
Tirole,1990).  
Vertical integration changes that picture. If the efficiency gap between the efficient and the 
inefficient supplier is not too big exclusion of a downstream firm is never optimal. It is then 
always more profitable for the integrated efficient firm to also supply the rival retailer a 
quantity corresponding to what it would supply if it contracted with the inefficient supplier. If 
the vertically integrated firm would not supply its non-integrated downstream rival, its 
inefficient upstream competitor would. Therefore, the vertically integrated firm is better off 
earning some extra profit by supplying its downstream rival. In equilibrium then, the market 
outcome is that of an asymmetric Cournot equilibrium, where the integrated firm sells the 
(lower) quantity to the rival supplier at a price equal to the inefficient supplier’s cost. In the 
presence of less efficient bypass, vertical integration can thus lead to a more efficient outcome 
than exclusive dealing. In the latter case, the downstream firm that is excluded from contracting 
with the efficient supplier would be forced to buy from the less efficient alternative supplier. 
This entails a welfare loss compared to the situation where this firm is supplied by the more 
efficient supplier. However, if the efficiency gap between the efficient and the inefficient 
supplier becomes too large, the monopoly outcome obtains, and the rival retailer is fully 
excluded from the market (i.e. produces zero quantity). Exclusion might then be socially 
optimal because the alternative would be production by an inefficient supplier. 
Explaining when firms find it profit maximizing not to supply downstream competitors, or 
to supply them at high prices, is the core of a theory of foreclosure. If foreclosure arises due to a 
merger, it should be an equilibrium strategy in the post-merger market structure. Viewed in this 
light, some core papers on the foreclosure effects of mergers (Salinger (1988), who considers 
strategic substitutes and Ordover et al. (1990) who considers strategic complements) are more 
relevant in assessing the potential impact of mergers on competition under the assumption that 
foreclosure arises, than in assessing under what circumstances we should expect foreclosure to 
occur. In essence, these papers simply assume that post merger a firm can commit not to buy or   39 
sell in the upstream market (Reiffen (1992)).
19 While this assumption may seem intuitive (as the 
resulting act of foreclosure ‘raises the downstream rival’s costs’, it improves the vertically 
integrated firm’s profit in the downstream market), it has been demonstrated that in simple 
models, such foreclosure is not an equilibrium strategy. (In addition, the results seem to rely on 
an assumption of linear contracts between up- and downstream rivals.) Without additional 
commitment mechanisms, foreclosure is no longer an equilibrium and participating in the 
upstream market is profitable (Gaudet and Long (1996) and Higgins (1999)). To assess the 
question whether or not a risk of foreclosure exists due to a particular merger, an assessment of 
the credibility of this commitment is required. 
One approach to resolving the commitment problems, put forward by the original authors in 
response to criticisms along these lines (Ordover et al., 1992), relies on introducing a specific 
dynamic contracting game. This approach has led to some controversy as well, see church 
(2004) for a summary. Some alternative mechanisms have been proposed that allow vertically 
merged firms to credibly commit to foreclose. Choi and Yi (2002) and Avenel and Barlet 
(2000) introduce commitment by allowing vertically integrated firms to choose for specific 
instead of generic technologies. If a vertically integrated pair of upstream and downstream firms 
chooses a specific technology (which requires making an ex ante investment), they can no 
longer participate in the upstream market. Such an investment then creates the commitment not 
to participate in the upstream market for the intermediary good (which would require the 
generic technology). Non-integrated firms can also choose to invest in such technologies, but 
will not do so due to the risk of ex post appropriation (hold-up problem). Although this does 
provide a way in which credible commitment (not to supply) can be achieved, it still has to be 
verified that making this commitment is in fact desirable for the integrated firm. In Choi and Yi, 
the gains of such a strategy are a result of assumptions on differences in profitability between 
specialised versus general technology markets. 
Chen (2001) introduces efficiency differences upstream (asymmetric marginal costs) and a 
switching cost if a downstream firm wants to change supplier. In this setup, if a merged firm 
supplies a downstream rival it has an incentive to raise its downstream prices, since higher 
downstream prices increase the demand for the unintegrated downstream firm’s product. This in 
turn increases upstream demand for the intermediate product, which increases profits for the 
integrated firm’s upstream division. The softening of downstream competition as a result of 
supplies to a rival influences this rival’s choice of input supplier. In the upstream market, the 
integrated firm can charge a mark-up as a result of its higher efficiency compared to upstream 
(non-integrated) rivals. There is no incentive for a counter merger. On the one hand a counter 
 
19 Ordover et al. (1990) assume that the vertically integrated firm can commit either not to participate in the upstream 
market, or to supply the non-integrated firm downstream firm if the price charged by the remaining upstream firm becomes 
too high. How this commitment is achieved is not explained. Salinger (1988) makes strong assumptions which ensure that 
the vertically integrated firm do not supply non-integrated downstream competitors (i.e. they do not participate in the 
intermediate good market). In particular, his model assumes that downstream firms are quantity setters in the retail market, 
but price takers when demanding a fixed proportions input in the wholesale market.   40 
merger would increase downstream competition, lowering downstream prices (which lowers 
profit), on the other hand it would increase the market share of the unintegrated upstream firm 
because it is no longer excluded (which increases profit). Chen shows that the downstream 
losses outweigh the upstream gains. Note that this mechanism only works if there is 
downstream Bertrand competition. If there is Cournot competition, when choosing its output the 
integrated firms takes the market share of the unintegrated downstream retailer as given. The 
integrated firm’s upstream pricing decision is therefore not linked to its quantity choices the in 
downstream market.  
2.5.3  Multiple vertical integration and downstream entry 
We conclude this section by considering a particular case of a vertically integrated market 
structure, namely one in which all upstream firms are integrated, and the question is to what 
extent these firms will accommodate downstream (non-integrated) entry. This situation is of 
considerable importance in practice, as in many cases upstream bottleneck owners are active 
downstream already. An example is the telecommunications market in the Netherlands, where 
multiple networks (e.g. DSL and cable) are present all providing more or less the same 
downstream services. The issue here is to what extent downstream entrants are provided access 
onto the oligopoly networks in the absence of regulation. Similarly, in renewable energy 
production, upstream producers often are integrated with downstream retailers, and if the 
market for renewable certificates is concentrated, the question is whether independent retailers 
will have access to such certificates.  
We limit ourselves to downstream Cournot competition and consider the case of general 
non-linear contracts. In this case we can apply the theoretical framework developed by 
Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
20 As discussed in section 2.4 they study non-linear contracts in 
a market with contracting externalities between upstream suppliers and downstream retailers. A 
market with two vertically integrated suppliers competing downstream and one downstream 
entrant contracting with the suppliers constitutes a concrete example of such a configuration. A 
contracting externality arises because the contract between the entrant and the one supplier 
directly affects the profit of the other supplier, who is not included in the contract negotiations. 
In principle, there are three possible outcomes. First, exclusion might be the equilibrium. In 
this case, neither upstream firm supplies the downstream entrant. For each firm it should 
therefore be optimal not to supply given that the other firm does not supply. Second, the 
equilibrium might be an exclusive contract between one of the suppliers and the entrant. By 
signing with the one supplier it foregoes the opportunity of signing a contract with the other 
upstream supplier. The terms of this exclusive contract will be influenced by this opportunity 
cost and competition between the suppliers influences the terms of the contracts. Note that 
although the contract is exclusive and one of the supplier is excluded from selling to the entrant, 
 
20 If a contract between a supplier and the entrant is private   41 
this supplier is not excluded from the market. Third, the equilibrium might be that both 
suppliers supply the entrant. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) call this a common contract. 
Obviously, common contracts do not lead to exclusion of any of the firms.  
Exclusion 
Exclusion is an equilibrium strategy if it is optimal for both suppliers to supply nothing to the 
entrant given that the other supplier does not supply anything. In particular, neither supplier 
should want to deviate by offering a nonzero quantity to the entrant. If the one supplier doesn’t 
provide access, the other supplier can offer a contract extracting all the entrant’s rents (because 
the entrant’s opportunity cost of signing the contract is zero). In addition, the non-linear 
contract allows the supplier to determine the quantity sold by the entrant. Therefore, the 
supplier will simply maximize its profits plus that of the entrant given that it competes with the 
other vertically integrated supplier in the downstream market. To assess whether foreclosure is 
an equilibrium strategy if the suppliers use non-linear contracts, the question is whether selling 
nothing through the entrant is an optimal strategy for a hypothetical entity that integrates the 
entrant and one of the upstream suppliers.  
Foreclosure will be optimal for such an integrated entity if supplying the entrant with a 
nonzero quantity reduces its profits relative to the situation where the entrant produces nothing. 
In general, it is hard to imagine markets with such a property. If products are differentiated, 
allowing the entrant to sell a nonzero quantity in many cases increases the total profit of the 
downstream entrant and the upstream supplier. Thus, in most models with differentiated goods 
supplying the entrant with a nonzero quantity is optimal and blocking entry is not an 
equilibrium.
21 In models with homogeneous goods, if retail costs are equal the integrated entity 
will be indifferent to which firm sells the product in the final market. Thus, exclusion of the 
entrant will often not be an equilibrium strategy if non-linear contracts can be written. 
Exclusive contract with one of the suppliers 
As in the monopoly case, the existence of contracting externalities is crucial in determining 
what types of contracts are optimal. The type of contracts will be selected to maximize the joint 
surplus of the vertically integrated supplier and the entrant (the first general principle noted by 
Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). If there are no contracting externalities, either exclusive 
contracts yield the same outcome as common contracts or common contracts dominate 
exclusive ones. Therefore, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for exclusionary contracts 
to be preferred to common contracts is that there should be contracting externalities present. 
Competition between the vertically integrated suppliers in the downstream markets constitutes 
 
21 An exception would be when the entrant’s retail costs are higher than the incumbents’, and goods are not very 
heterogeneous. Then entry would not occur, but this would also be socially undesirable.    42 
such an externality. Therefore, we might expect that in some cases exclusive contracts are 
optimal if suppliers are vertically integrated.  
If it is optimal for the one integrated supplier to supply the non-integrated retailer if the 
other integrated supplier does not, the two suppliers will compete to be the retailer’s supplier. In 
this way they compete away part of their profits. To what extent this happens is determined by 
the profit of the vertically integrated firm that does not supply the entrant. If downstream 
competition is in quantities, and upstream competition in prices, competition between the 
vertically integrated suppliers will always result in access at marginal costs. However, if 
downstream competition is in prices instead of quantities, the profit of the entrant’s supplier can 
be lower than the profit of the other supplier but higher than the profit if both suppliers do not 
supply the entrant. The supplying incumbent has an incentive to reduce its own output because 
this raises downstream prices which increases the entrant’s market share and the supplying 
incumbent’s profit from upstream sales. If this softening of downstream competition to increase 
upstream profit happens, the vertically integrated firms will not compete to be the entrant’s 
supplier. In a way, supplying the entrant is similar to producing a common good: both suppliers 
benefit if the entrant is supplied, but both want the other to supply him (Bourreau et al. 2007). 
Linear contracts 
Ordover and Shaffer (2006) assume linear pricing and consider a model with upstream and downstream Bertrand 
competition. They show that if downstream entry results in so-called own-supplier cannibalization, equilibria exist where 
no firm provides entry. Own-supplier cannibalization occurs if supplying an entrant mainly reduces the suppliers own 
market share.
22 On the other hand if entry results in so-called proportional cannibalization, the entrant is supplied at 
marginal costs. Proportional cannibalization occurs if supplying an entrant equally reduces both suppliers’ market share. 
 
2.6  Summary of the theory 
Vertical foreclosure occurs when an individual firm in one of two vertically related markets 
directly or indirectly denies or limits access to its input. It is a common phenomenon in 
vertically related markets and arises most often as a consequence of exclusive contracts or 
vertical integration. Exclusive contracts restrict a supplier’s possible sales to other retailers or a 
retailer from carrying other suppliers’ products. As a result, the firms who are not party to the 
contract are restricted in either their sourcing or selling opportunity. Vertical integration 
changes a firm’s incentives to supply to other retailers or to buy from other suppliers and may 
lead a firm to withdraw from the intermediate good’s market. As a consequence, 
competitiveness of the intermediate good’s market changes, affecting the vertically integrated 
firm’s competitors. 
 
22 In fact, with uniform prices own-supplier cannibalization implies that the entrant’s market share is obtained one for one 
from the supplying incumbent’s market share.    43 
Vertical foreclosure is not necessarily anti-competitive. Indeed, vertical integration and 
exclusive contracts in most cases benefit consumers by enhancing the efficiency of the 
participating firms. The decentralized nature of commercial decisions that affect the efficiency 
of the whole vertical structure creates externalities, which lead to inefficiencies. Vertical 
integration and exclusive contracts can (partially) internalize these externalities. Important 
efficiency effects are the elimination of double marginalisation, the reduction of incentives to 
free-ride and the elimination of hold-up problems. 
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which the strategies that lead to foreclosure lower 
welfare; when the main motivation for restricting access to an input (for example by exclusive 
contracts or vertical integration) is to put efficient rivals at a competitive disadvantage, or even 
to force them to leave the market (or not enter it in the first place). Below we briefly sketch the 
circumstances under which welfare reducing foreclosure can occur. We distinguish between 
three situations. First, there can be a monopoly either upstream or downstream. Second, there 
can be an oligopoly both upstream and downstream. This is called a bilateral oligopoly. Third, 
there can be a bilateral oligopoly with vertical integration. 
Monopoly 
The theory of exclusive contracts is relatively well understood for situations where either the 
upstream or the downstream segment of the market is a monopoly. In this case, economists of 
the so-called Chicago school have argued that there are no anticompetitive motivations for 
having exclusive contracts: the monopolist should be able to earn its monopoly profits anyway, 
and cannot earn more than that by signing exclusive contracts. More recent literature has 
challenged this view: while indeed exclusive contracts cannot increase profits beyond 
monopoly profits, such contracts may be essential to the monopolist in protecting its monopoly 
profits. In other words, the market may be more competitive than suggested by the monopoly 
position (and profits lower than monopoly profits) in the absence of exclusivity clauses or 
similar agreements. 
The condition under which this result holds (and indeed, under which an anti-competitive 
effect of exclusivity occurs) is that the non-monopoly segment’s firms should have profits that 
directly depend on the contracts that the monopolist signs with the other firms in this segment. 
This condition is met, for instance, when the monopolist is a supplier who contracts with 
retailers that compete in the same market: in this case, the monopolist’s supplies to a retailer’s 
rival affects the price in the downstream market, and hence the retailer’s profit. It is not met, 
conversely, if the retailers sell in different (non-competing) markets, or if the monopolist is a 
retailer who buys from non-monopoly suppliers whose costs do not depend on the supplies to 
the monopolist from their rivals.   44 
Bilateral oligopoly 
In bilateral oligopoly, both up- and downstream markets are characterised by oligopoly 
structures. While theory of such cases is not fully crystallised yet, various predictions emerge 
from existing models. 
The case for welfare reducing input foreclosure is similar to that in the situation of upstream 
monopoly. Provided the upstream oligopoly leads to significant market power for (any of) the 
upstream firms, and downstream oligopoly is relatively competitive, input foreclosure may be 
an equilibrium strategy protecting the upstream oligopoly rents. 
While, conversely, welfare reducing customer foreclosure was no issue in the monopoly 
situations, it may manifest itself in the bilateral oligopoly. Under the condition that at the 
upstream level there are scale advantages, either as a result of economies of scale in production 
or as a consequence of network externalities among consumers, exclusion of one of the 
manufacturers can be an equilibrium. Since in this case multiple buyers are necessary to allow a 
competitor to stay in the market, an upstream firm may exclude his rival by exploiting 
coordination difficulties among retailers. This effect may be reduced if downstream competition 
is sufficiently fierce that an individual retailer may capture a large share of the market if it 
prices below its rivals’ price levels.  
Partial or full integration 
If firms are vertically integrated, but face competition in both up- and downstream markets, 
exclusion of non-integrated rivals does not seem to be profitable in many cases. Supplying 
independent retailers or buying from independent (more efficient) suppliers will often increase 
profits ex post. A prerequisite for successful exclusion seems to be that firms can somehow 
commit not to supply to or buy from non-integrated competitors. Such commitment may 
originate in choosing firm specific technologies.  
In markets with multiple vertically integrated firms, two key questions should be answered. 
First, is it profitable for an individual vertically integrated firm to supply a non-integrated 
retailer, if none of the other vertically integrated firms does so? Sometimes supplying a non-
integrated retailer leads to own-product cannibalization: the new retailer gains mainly at the 
expense of the supplying firm’s market share. In that case, full exclusion can be a market 
outcome. If the entrant also gains substantial market share from a competing integrated player, 
at least one of the vertically integrated firms will supply a non-integrated retailer. Second, to 
what extent do the vertically integrated suppliers compete to be the non-integrated retailer’s 
supplier? The answer seems to depend on the nature of downstream competition. If retailers 
compete mainly in quantities, competition to be the non-integrated retailer’s supplier will be 
fierce and retailers will be supplied at competitive prices. For price competition, there might be 
no competition to be the non-integrated retailer’s supplier at all, implying that retailers will be 
supplied at high prices.   45 
3  Empirical literature 
In this section, we discuss the empirical literature on foreclosure. Although limited in scope, it 
complements the competitive assessment on the basis of pure theory and the antitrust cases 
discussed in the policy section. 
3.1  Classification of empirical studies 
Empirical papers fall in two categories. The one which factors stimulate vertical integration, 
and matches these findings with the theory. The other studies whether vertical restraints or 
vertical integration have led to foreclosure (that can be either naked exclusion or raising rivals' 
costs) and if so, how efficiency was affected. Efficiency is measured by changes in prices and 
quantities after the vertical relationship was established. Decreasing prices or increasing 
quantities show that production became more efficient, yielding lower costs, and consumers 
were better off. The analyses mainly use price and market share data. However, cost data is 
often not available due to its commercial sensitivity. 
The empirical literature on foreclosure can also be classified according to the techniques 
used. A large group of studies apply the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and 
estimate reduced models by using classical econometric techniques such as cross-section, time 
series and panel data analysis, natural experiments or event studies. Lafontaine and Slade (2005 
and 2006) and Cooper et al. (2005) provide an extensive summary of this studies literature. 
These models however do not allow for an identification of the underlying microeconomic 
parameters. To address this issue, structural models based on the equilibrium of economic 
models for imperfect competition were developed. This development was termed new empirical 
industrial organization (NEIO).  Taking market structure characteristics into consideration, 
these models are able to provide more robust results. The other advantage is that one can 
evaluate changes of regulation ex ante, by running simulations based on models tested 
previously on pre-change data. So far, there have been very few applications of NEIO in the 
field of vertical restraints (see e.g. Asker (2004a,b), Brenkers and Verboven (2006), and 
Mortimer (2004); NEIO is more commonly used for horizontal-market structures). However 
this methodology is developing rapidly. The following box describes these techniques. 
3.2  Techniques used 
Structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
The most straightforward way to examine how vertical agreements affect welfare is to analyze 
descriptive statistics. However due to providing little explanatory value by itself, descriptive 
statistics are combined with econometric analysis. Three main classical methods can be   46 
distinguished: (i) cross section, time series and panel data analysis of firms and regions, (ii) 
natural experiments, and (iii) event studies (for more extensive discussion and also for the 
theoretical models behind see Lafontaine and Slade, 2005 and 2006). 
Cross section analysis performs multivariate regression across retail establishments that are 
or are not in vertical relations. Besides a dummy variable indicating the presence of vertical 
restraints, the effects of other variable relating to supply, demand and policy on prices or 
quantities are also estimated. A common problem of cross section analysis is relating to 
endogeneity of variables. To overcome this problem and if unobserved heterogeneity is time-
invariant, panel data analysis can be performed. Otherwise and also to compare prices, 
quantities or market shares before and after changes in vertical relations or in legislation, time 
series analysis can be run. However in this case other factors changing over time have to be 
considered as well. 
Policy changes can also be considered as natural experiments in the sense that it is an 
exogenous factor in the market and affects a certain group of firms or brands (treatment group) 
and leaves other firms or brands unaffected (control group). The differences of respective 
variables between these groups are estimated, and then compared within regions (called 
difference-in-difference estimator). If the estimate is not constant but depends on changes in the 
respective variables, one can conclude on how the policy change affected prices and quantities 
in that region. This technique is widely used when assessing the effects of vertical divorcement. 
When a firm is publicly traded, the effects of an event relating to vertical restraints on that 
firm's value can be examined by using stock market data. Excursion in value may be easily 
shown if the respective event was unexpected. However a legal change or an anti-trust case is 
rather predictable since they spread out over time, therefore these events can be partitioned into 
sub events. After estimating a system of seemingly unrelated regressions of each sub event, 
estimates across them are added to find the overall effect of the whole event. 
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) 
In the recent empirical literature, articles arise which aim at having a better understanding of the 
industry structure. Econometric models are based upon the equilibrium solution of such 
theoretical models for imperfectly competitive markets that fit best to the market in question. 
This empirical technique starts from game theoretical models of industrial organization where 
the equilibrium is determined by strategic interaction between market participants (see Pakes, 
2007) and allow for identification of the underlying behavioral parameters. However the 
empirical analysis has to take into consideration that theoretical models are based on 
assumptions, hence the most robust theoretical results have to be used to gain verifiable 
empirical results. 
Imperfectly competitive markets are characterized by prices containing a mark-up over 
costs. In principle, these mark-ups together with prices can be used to measure market power,   47 
and costs can be used to assess efficiency gains (later in the analysis other factors leading to 
lower costs, such as development of costs over time are ruled out). However, although price 
data is often easily accessible, actual cost data is hardly available due to its commercial 
sensitivity. Therefore costs have to be estimated. 
The general analysis goes as follows (based on Berry et al., 1995): demand estimates, such as 
own- and cross-price elasticities are obtained based on price data. From these elasticities, price 
mark-ups are calculated according to the equilibrium outcome of the respective theoretical 
model. Using estimated mark-ups and actual prices, costs are computed. Costs and prices are 
then used to test whether exclusive deals lead to raising rivals' costs: cost-based foreclosure 
(e.g. forcing rivals to use higher cost distribution channels) or promotion-based foreclosure (e.g. 
forcing rivals to use distributors with less effective promotion capacity), respectively. 
Foreclosure is also tested in a control group to rule out other factors leading to effects similar to 
foreclosure. These structural models are tested with either full-information maximum likelihood 
technique (if there is no identification problem) or with GMM (when instruments need to be 
used). 
Shortcoming of empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis may generally fail for three main reasons: insufficient amount and type 
of data, inappropriate technique, and shortcomings of the economic model in use. 
The amount and type of data available in certain cases may not be satisfactory, which 
impedes appropriate analysis. The main data sources lie in research done for industry reports or 
commissioned by companies and other institutes or organizations. Furthermore companies in 
general have enormous amounts of information, however it is not public or difficult to acquire 
because of commercial confidentiality. Therefore the available data set does not necessarily 
cover the whole market. As it was mentioned earlier, for the same reason, cost data, serving as 
the basis of supply side analysis is generally unavailable. Even though, for instance in NEIO 
analysis, price mark-ups can be used to estimate marginal costs, fixed costs cannot be taken into 
consideration by this measure. Ignoring fixed cost may therefore distort the analysis if an 
important pro-competitive effect, the economies of scale takes place at any level of the market. 
Finally, data has to be adjusted as much as possible to the question in mind and also to the time 
horizon in which the problem is assessed. For instance, one of the most common critiques about 
price data is that it reflects list prices and not prices realized in trade which contain discounts. 
The reliability of methodology used in empirical analysis certainly depends on the data 
used. Therefore if data is not sufficient or accurate, the analysis has to consider potential 
corrections and intuitions on how those corrections would modify the results. This problem 
might relate to other shortcomings of empirical techniques such as unobserved heterogeneity or 
ignoring time-variant factors. A careful consideration of the appropriate methodology may 
overcome this problem.   48 
In general, economic models are used as a basis for empirical analysis. It has to be noted that in 
economic models assumptions are made to keep the framework tractable. Being restrictive, 
particularly on the market structure, on the number of players at each production level and on 
the information set of firms, such assumptions may also diminish the explanatory value of the 
respective empirical study. 
Nonetheless, it has to be stressed that despite these shortcomings of empirical research, 
when economic theory leads to ambiguous effects, policy makers may have a better 
understanding of vertical restraints by relying on empirics to measure which of the effects 
dominates. 
Most studies analyze markets with low concentration measure, although some degree of 
market power might be present. Frequently analyzed markets are the beer market and gasoline 
industry. Empirical evidence concerning concentrated industries is scarce. As a consequence, 
relatively few studies examine markets with high concentration measures. Examples are the 
cement and concrete industry, cable television programming and distribution, and oil refining 
and distribution. Hence lessons should be taken with some caution due to the limited number of 
studies. In contrast to the limited number of empirical studies of concentrated markets, these 
industries have received considerable attention of competition authorities precisely because they 
are concentrated. 
Empirical literature in general supports the theoretical finding on under which circumstances 
a supplier engages in vertical integration with the retailer (i.e. bigger investments, higher 
complexity of inputs and more uncertainty in the environment). However results on when a 
retailer integrates with a supplier vary over the literature: effects of some factors revealed in the 
theoretical literature are confirmed (i.e. effort of firms), some effects are opposed (i.e. 
uncertainty), and for effects of some other factors empirics do not provide robust results. 
Independently of the techniques used and markets analyzed, the empirical literature 
generally shows that privately negotiated exclusive contracts are often efficiency enhancing. 
Moreover exclusive dealing increases - or at least does not decrease - consumer welfare. These 
findings are explained in somewhat more detailed in the next section.   49 
3.3  Main empirical findings 
The first group of the empirical studies assesses which factors determine whether vertical 
integration between an independent supplier and a retailer comes about. The empirical analysis 
based on a theoretical model intends to verify the results of that particular model. Two types of 
integration are examined: (1) a retailer integrates with supplier or remains independent, and (2) 
a supplier integrates with a retailer (make or buy decision). 
Empirical literature independently on the technique used supports the theoretical findings
23 
in that the higher the effort a retailer (a supplier) exerts, the less (more) likely a retail will 
vertically integrate with a supplier. However, the opposite to the theoretical result saying that 
increased risk makes integration more likely is confirmed by the empirical analysis. Whether 
empirics match the theory in assessing the effects of other factors, such as cost of monitoring 
efforts, outlet size, brand value, etc., strictly depends on the specification of the models used in 
the empirical analysis. Nonetheless, the incentives why a supplier is willing to integrate with a 
retailer
24, that is larger investments, higher complexity of inputs and more uncertainty in the 
environment, are fully supported in the empirical literature. 
The second group of studies analyzing the effects of vertical restraints on welfare is robust 
in verifying the pro-competitive nature of vertical mergers even in case of concentrated 
markets, however the evidence in highly concentrated markets is still rather insufficient. 
Lafontaine and Slade (2006) and Cooper et al. (2005) provide an extensive summary of the 
existing empirical literature based on different classical techniques. The assessment of 
foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs motives received most of the attention in the econometrics 
literature. Moreover, these effects have been more often analyzed in concentrated markets, such 
as cement and concrete, cable TV programming and distribution, and oil refining and 
distribution. Some of the collected empirical papers disclose evidence of exclusion or practices 
that negatively affect rivals as a result of privately imposed vertical restraints. Excluding 
services, however, does not necessarily result in foreclosure of firms from the market (e.g. cable 
market where exclusive dealing leads to less product variety at each cable company, see Chipty, 
2001). Furthermore, as it is also shown in the theoretical literature, even if foreclosure takes 
place, it is usually found to be accompanied by efficiency gains, such as lessened double 
marginalization, positive dynamic effects or higher quality of products or services. 
Two of these papers (Mullin and Mullin, 1997 on steel industry and Chipty, 2001 on cable 
distribution) assess the trade-off between these two effects and show that efficiency gains 
generally outweigh the welfare loss of foreclosure. Moreover, privately imposed vertical 
restraints generally led to lower costs, lower prices and greater consumption and in these 
instances benefited consumers or at least did not harm them. 
 
23 The studies are mainly based on moral hazard models, for more detail see Lafontaine and Slade (2006). 
24 Transaction-cost or occasionally property-rights models form the main theory behind. See Lafontaine and Slade (2006).   50 
Similar results are found by using the methods of new empirical industrial organization. Asker 
(2004a, 2004b), analyzing both cost-based foreclosure (forcing rivals to use higher cost 
distribution channels) and promotion-based foreclosure (forcing rivals to use distributors with 
less effective promotion capacity) in the US beer market, considers a model with a three-stage 
complete information game where products are horizontally differentiated. In his paper 
upstream players (brewers) form an oligopoly and the retailer (a supermarket chain) has a 
monopoly position. Distributors represent a tier between these two layers, and may contract 
exclusively with the brewers, although they have an essentially passive role in the game. A 
stylized model of this market describes downstream monopoly with upstream competitions, in 
which market, according to the theory, no anticompetitive customer foreclosure may be 
expected. Asker indeed shows that anti-competitive effects are unfounded in the beer market. 
His results are supported by three findings: (i) demand increases in the presence of an exclusive 
distributor, (ii) marginal costs are lower for brewers with exclusive distributors and (iii) not 
higher for rival brewers in the same region. 
To conclude, we emphasize that the existing empirical evidence seems to support the claims 
that vertical integration often occurs when participating parties find it beneficial and at the same 
time it increases consumer welfare and efficiency. Empirical findings are also in line with 
theoretical predictions in the following sense: when there is fierce competition upstream and 
downstream, studies show that although foreclosure took place in most of the cases, it made 
consumers better off. This implies that in these markets efficiency enhancing effects dominate 
welfare reducing effects. Studies assessing particularly the trade-off between pro- and anti-
competitive effects find positive overall welfare effect in case of markets with sufficient 
downstream competition and some upstream market power. Independently of techniques used, 
studies yield the same conclusion, however the NEIO approach is more applicable if welfare 
gains and effects of policy intervention have to be considered. Some findings in the 
econometrics literature are summarized in the following table.   51 
Table 3.1  Empirical studies – effects of vertical restraints on welfare  
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4  Policy framework 
In this section, we discuss how the insights from our analysis can be translated into a 
framework that policy makers can use to analyse the potential for welfare reducing vertical 
foreclosure. We identify four important steps.  
First, any assessment should start with the question whether in this market foreclosure, if it 
would occur, has the potential to reduce welfare. If this is not the case, foreclosure, though it 
might occur in practise, is not a relevant policy issue.  
Second, if welfare reducing foreclosure is in principle possible, we should assess whether it 
is also likely to happen. Based on the theory presented in chapter 2 we distinguish between 
different market structures and different types of vertical foreclosure. In each case, we can 
provide some guidance to the circumstances under which foreclosure may be an equilibrium. 
Third, if a theory of foreclosure is formulated, we should assess whether there exist welfare 
enhancing effects of the vertical restrains or vertical integration that can outweigh the 
detrimental effects. The empirical literature suggests that such effects are almost always 
present, but does not distinguish between different effects. On the basis of economic theory it is 
often possible to argue that some effects are more likely to be present than others.  
Fourth, if foreclosure is likely and the welfare decreasing effects are larger than the welfare 
enhancing effects, we should assess what policies are suitable to address foreclosure. It is 
important to realize that foreclosure can be realized in several ways. Banning one of them may 
lead firms to substitute another. In addition, different policy instruments differ in intrusiveness. 
Policymakers should opt for less intrusive interventions before resorting to more severe 
measures. Finally, the possibility of assessment errors should not be neglected. What is worse: 
prohibiting a contract or merger for which the welfare enhancing effects outweigh the welfare 
reducing effects of foreclosure or allowing a contract or merger for which the welfare reducing 
effects of foreclosure outweigh the welfare enhancing effects? 
Each of these steps is discussed in more detail below. 
4.1  Is there sufficient upstream and downstream competition? 
Theory and empirics both show that vertical foreclosure is not very likely to be welfare 
reducing when there is sufficient competition both upstream and downstream. Although an 
exclusive contract between a supplier and a retailer denies competing retailers access to that 
particular supplier, or competing suppliers access to that particular retailer, neither upstream nor 
downstream competition is reduced because there are enough other suppliers and retailers. 
Therefore, if exclusive contracts and vertical integration occur in such markets (and they do 
in reality), it will be purely for efficiency reasons. This theoretical prediction seems to be 
confirmed by the empirical literature: when there is fierce competition upstream as well as   53 
downstream, all empirical studies we are aware of (see chapter 3) show that although 
foreclosure took place in most of the cases, it made consumers better off. 
4.2  Is welfare reducing vertical foreclosure likely? 
If market power is present somewhere in the vertical chain, denying or limiting competitors’ 
access to an intermediary input or to customers may reduce competition. In this case, 
foreclosure may be welfare reducing. 
Based on the theory in chapter 2, we distinguish between two types of foreclosure: input 
foreclosure and customer foreclosure. Input foreclosure happens when downstream retailers are 
foreclosed from buying from a particular upstream supplier. Customer foreclosure happens 
when an upstream supplier is foreclosed from selling to a particular retailer. The theory predicts 
that the likeliness and type of welfare reducing vertical foreclosure differs between markets 
with and without vertical integration. In addition, markets where there are several competing 
vertically integrated combinations from markets where there is a single vertically integrated 
entity. 
No vertical integration 
1.  If a monopoly exists upstream while the downstream industry is potentially competitive, there is 
a danger of input foreclosure. As discussed in section 2.4, an upstream monopolist negotiating 
with many downstream retailers faces difficulties in credibly restricting its output. By vertically 
integrating or signing exclusive contracts the monopolist can credibly limit its downstream sales 
and restore market power. Customer foreclosure is not an issue here, because there is only one 
upstream firm.  
2.  If a monopoly exists downstream while the upstream industry is potentially competitive there is 
little probability of customer foreclosure. As discussed in section 2.4, the downstream 
monopolist cannot gain market power by signing exclusive contracts with upstream suppliers, 
because it can fully determine how much it sells to consumers and at what price. Input 
foreclosure is not an issue because there is only one downstream firm.  
3.  If both the upstream as well as the downstream market are oligopolistic, while economies of 
scale or network effects are important upstream, customer foreclosure may occur. Entry in the 
upstream market then requires a particular scale and may be prohibited by signing exclusive 
contracts with a sufficient number of downstream retailers. Fierce downstream competition may 
reduce the number of contracted retailers necessary to achieve sufficient scale for entry. This 
reduces the scope for customer foreclosure. 
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Vertical integration  
1.  If a monopoly exists upstream while the downstream industry is competitive, then some degree 
of foreclosure is likely without the need for explicit exclusion. By vertically integrating, the 
monopolist can credibly limit supplies to non-integrated retailers. 
2.  However, exclusion is less likely if there are (non-integrated) upstream rivals that are almost as 
efficient as the vertically integrated firm. The integrated firm is then limited in its possibility to 
extract rents from the retailer because of the retailer’s option to source from the upstream rival. 
Only if firms can physically commit (e.g. by choosing incompatibility) exclusive practices may 
be an equilibrium. 
 
Multiple competing vertically integrated combinations 
1.  Foreclosure of downstream entrants becomes less likely as they are more likely to win market 
share from integrated competitors (e.g. if upstream products are close substitutes). 
2.  Foreclosure of downstream entrants becomes more likely if their retail products are closer 
substitutes to the provider’s own retail products than to those of the provider’s vertically 
integrated rivals (e.g. if upstream products are very differentiated). 
 
Table 4.1 below summarises these results.  
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Table 4.1  Is welfare reducing vertical foreclosure likely? 





No vertical integration       
Case 1: A monopoly exists upstream while 




  Danger of welfare reducing input 
foreclosure. Welfare reducing customer 
foreclosure is not an issue because there 
is only one upstream firm. 
Case 2: A monopoly exists downstream 
while the upstream industry is potentially 
competitive 
    Little probability of welfare reducing 
customer foreclosure. Welfare reducing 
input foreclosure is not an issue because 
there is only one downstream firm. 
Case 3: Upstream oligopoly, downstream 





Danger of welfare reducing input 
foreclosure. In addition, welfare reducing 
customer foreclosure may be rational if the 
upstream sector exhibits strong 
economies of scale or network effects. 
Fierce downstream competition may 
reduce the risk of customer foreclosure. 
       
Vertical integration       




  Some degree of welfare reducing 
foreclosure, without the need for explicit 
exclusion 
Case 2: Upstream competition (efficient 
upstream rivals) 
    Welfare reducing exclusion less likely, 
except if upstream firms manage to 
commit not to supply rivals, e.g. by 
choosing incompatible production 
technology 
       
Multiple competing vertically integrated 
combinations 
     
Case 1: upstream products are not highly 
differentiated  
    Welfare reducing foreclosure of 
downstream entrants less likely, as these 
will (also) win market share from 
integrated competitors  




  Welfare reducing foreclosure of 
downstream entrants may be rational 
since retail products will be closer 
substitutes to the product sold by the 
access provider 
   56 
4.3  Is foreclosure detrimental to welfare? 
Even if foreclosure has welfare reducing effects, the strategies that lead to foreclosure often also 
have welfare enhancing effects. In fact, the overview of the empirical literature in chapter 3 
shows that efficiency effects were present in almost all cases studied in the literature. Although 
one should be careful not to draw general conclusions from the limited set of industries under 
consideration, this seems to indicate that in first instance policymakers should assume that 
efficiency enhancing effects are present.  
In practice, assessing the relative magnitude of welfare enhancing and welfare reducing 
effects requires a detailed empirical analysis. This can be very difficult and we do not address 
how to measure such effects empirically. However, based on the theory, guidelines can be given 
as to when particular welfare enhancing effects may be present and when they will be absent.  
 
Double marginalisation 
Double marginalisation occurs if the input price an upstream supplier charges to a downstream 
retailer contains a mark-up over its marginal costs, and the downstream retailer in turn charges a 
mark-up over this input price (its marginal costs) to the consumer. The resulting consumer 
prices are inefficiently high and may be above the monopoly level. 
Double marginalisation is not an issue if there is sufficient downstream competition. In this 
case, downstream prices will be competitive and the only price mark-up will be at the upstream 
level. Nonlinear contracts can eliminate double marginalisation. For example, two part tariffs, 
allow firms to set the price for an intermediate good close to marginal costs, and extract profits 
by setting an appropriate fixed fee. However, if goods are (easily) tradable, non-linear contracts 
give rise to arbitrage opportunities and cannot be used. Suppliers will instead have to write 
linear contracts. The presence of large uncertainty about costs may also restrict the contracts 
that can be offered. Therefore, if downstream competition is weak and products are easily 
tradable or there exists large uncertainty about costs, vertical restraints or vertical integration 
can eliminate or reduce double marginalisation. 
 
Free rider effects 
Vertical contracts and vertical integration may reduce free rider effects. Free rider effects occur 
if firm specific investments are important and part of the benefits generated by investments spill 
over to competitors. Such spillovers can exist between retailers and between different brands. 
As an example of the former, consider investments by retailers in services like providing 
guidance to potential buyers. If these buyers can easily switch to other retailers free riding 
occurs and retailers will under invest.  
It is necessary that the benefits from the investment can not be appropriated by the retailer 
or the supplier. For example, if investments in a pub’s interior decoration make it more   57 
attractive for potential customers, this does not justify exclusive contracts with brewers. 
Although other brewers would free ride one brewer’s investments, the pub’s owner could invest 
him self and reap all the benefits due to the increase in customers. 
 
Hold-up problems 
Vertical integration and vertical contracts can also affect a firm’s incentive to invest by solving 
hold-up problems. For this it is necessary that benefits arising from the investment are non 
contractible and that opportunistic behaviour is possible. Exclusive contracts only affect the 
incentives to invest investment if the investment affects the value of trade with parties outside 
of the contract. 
In determining the effect on the level of firm specific investments of protecting such 
investments (for example by exclusive contracts) two aspects are relevant. First, who makes the 
investment: the supplier or the retailer? Second how does the investment affect the profits from 
the trade with other suppliers or retailers?  
Protecting firm specific investments will increase investments if (1) the supplier makes the 
investment and the investment decreases the value of external profits (i.e. decreases the value of 
the supplier’s outside option) or (2) the seller makes the investment and the investment 
increases the value of external profits. Protecting firm specific investments will decrease 
investments if (1) the supplier makes the investment and the investment increases the value of 
external profits, or (2) the seller makes the investment and the investment decreases the value 
of external profits (Whinston (2006)).  
 
Investment and innovation 
Foreclosure can also indirectly affect investment if it reduces competition. If investment in new 
technologies is important and can be recouped by the investor only if he can protect his market 
power by foreclosing access, prohibiting foreclosure may harm welfare. In general, the relation 
between competition and investment or innovation is ambiguous (Aghion et al. (2005)).  
Based on theoretical arguments, a negative relationship between competition and innovation 
may be expected in markets with several of the following characteristics: low marginal and high 
fixed costs, intensive use of labour and human capital, network effects, competition for the 
market (winner-takes-all-race) and very profitable market leaders (Evans and Schmalensee 
(2000), Canton (2002)). 
 
Type I and type II errors 
It is important to consider the consequences of assessment errors, the so-called ‘false positives’ 
and ‘false negatives’, or type I and type II errors. A Type I error corresponds to an unnecessary 
policy intervention, and a Type II error corresponds to not intervening when intervention was 
necessary. What is worse: prohibiting a contract or merger for which the welfare enhancing   58 
effects outweigh the welfare reducing effects of welfare reducing foreclosure or allowing a 
contract or merger for which the welfare reducing effects of welfare reducing foreclosure 
outweigh the welfare enhancing effects? 
Consider for clarity the simple case of a merger with both a competition decreasing effect 
due to foreclosure and a efficiency enhancing effect, e.g. because it solves double 
marginalisation.
25 Either the foreclosure effect outweighs the efficiency effect, in which case 
the merger should be prohibited, or the efficiency effect outweighs the foreclosure effect, in 
which case it should be allowed. However, an error in the assessment of these effects may lead 
to a wrong policy decision. What type of errors is more detrimental for welfare, and therefore is 
more important to prevent?  
The answer to the latter question depends on the relation between competition and 
innovation. Assume that in the long run the dynamic welfare effects resulting from innovations 
outweigh the short run static effects from efficiency and competition. A type I error increases 
competition, but reduces efficiency more. A type II error increases efficiency, but reduces 
competition more.  
If increased competition increases innovation, the efficiency reducing effect of a type I error 
is mitigated by the long run dynamic effects. However, the (in aggregate) negative effect on 
welfare of a type II error is only made worse. Therefore, in this case the emphasis should be on 
avoiding type II errors. If increased competition decreases innovation, the competition reducing 
effect of a type II error is partially mitigated by dynamic effects in the long run, whereas the 
negative effect on welfare of a type I error is only made worse. In this case the emphasis should 
be on avoiding type I errors. The table below summarizes this analysis. 
Table 4.2  Which error is more detrimental? 
  Type I error   Type II error 
     
More competition increases innovation   less detrimental   highly detrimental 
More competition decreases innovation   highly detrimental   less detrimental 
 
This implies that a positive relation between competition and innovation calls for a tough 
stance foreclosure: policymakers should avoid not intervening when intervention was needed. A 
negative relation between competition and innovation calls for a more lenient stance on 
foreclosure: policymakers should avoid intervening when intervention was not needed. 
 
25 The case of mergers with only efficiency enhancing or welfare reducing effects is probable very rare.    59 
4.4  Policies that can address foreclosure 
There are several policy options that can reduce the risk of welfare reducing foreclosure. We 
classify these into two main policy groups: structural and behavioural policies. Structural 
policies affect the market structure of the industry. They are more intrusive than behavioural 
policies, which affect firms’ behaviour under a given market structure.
26 Below we discuss each 
policy option in more detail. 
 
·  Structural policies 
·  Merger control 
·  Structural separation policies 
 
·  Behavioural policies 
·  Access regulation  
·  Common carrier policies 
·  Banning certain types of vertical restraints 
·  Ex-post enforcement of competition law 
·  Non-discrimination requirements 
·  Disclosure requirements 
 
Merger control  
Mergers beyond a certain size have to be assessed by competition authorities. The European 
Commission is currently working on the new Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal 
mergers, which provides a framework for such an assessment.
27 In the preliminary draft of this 
document, the Commission recognises that vertical mergers are generally less likely to create 
competition concerns than horizontal mergers, since they (i) do not entail the loss of direct 
competition between the merging firms; and (ii) provide scope for efficiencies (such as 
efficiency gains from better coordination, lower transaction costs, and consumer benefits from 
the possibility of one-stop shopping). Yet, there may be situations in which vertical mergers can 
affect consumer welfare negatively. 
With respect to foreclosure, the Guidelines specifically focus on “anticompetitive 
foreclosure”, defined as foreclosure in which “the merging companies – and, possibly, some of 
its competitors as well – may be able to profitably increase the price charged to consumers” (p.5 
of EC, 2007). The Commission proposes a three-step framework for the assessment of 
 
26 Here we apply the terminology, in according to which the term ‘structural’ is used as opposed to ‘behavioural’, in order to 
highlight that such policies intervene in the structure of the industry. Such terminology is used e.g. by OECD and ERT 
(European Round Table of Industrialists). Note that in other contexts the term ‘structural’ can also be used as a synonym of 
‘permanent’.  
27 More details are available on http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/non_horizontal_consultation.html.   60 
foreclosure. These three steps include the evaluation of (i) the ability to foreclose access (to 
inputs or to downstream markets); (ii) incentives to do it; and (iii) overall likely impact on 
effective competition.  
Since merger assessment is a difficult task, there is a positive probability of mistakes been 
made. These mistakes are classified into two types: Type I errors: efficient mergers may be 
disallowed and Type II errors: inefficient mergers may get through.
28 There are different views 
in Economics on the value of both types of errors and on the desirability of the government 
intervention to adjust the market structure. Stringent approach towards mergers is rooted into 
the belief that the welfare loss of letting a bad merger happen (Type II) is generally larger than 
the loss of rejecting a good merger (Type I), therefore, it is better to prevent bad mergers than to 
fight them ex post. Choosing for structural policies is in line with this reasoning. In contrast, 
according to the Chicago school, market would typically do better job than the state. 
Economists of the Chicago school would, therefore, rather commit an error of Type II, than an 
error of Type I , as they believe that Type I errors are typically more costly (see Voigt and 
Schmidt, 2003, for more discussion). Note that both types of errors have also ‘dynamic effects’, 
in the sense that either some potentially welfare improving mergers will not be pursued or, 
oppositely, a larger number of inefficient mergers will be notified. Improving assessment 
techniques helps to reduce both types of errors.  
Another important issue is that there may be situations in which, even if the merger of two 
firms has been banned, welfare reducing foreclosure may still be achieved by certain 
contractual arrangements among these firms. Therefore, banning a merger may not always solve 
the problem, and other measures may be needed. 
Structural separation policies 
While merger control is applied to firms that intend to integrate, structural separation policies, 
such as divestitures and line-of-business restrictions, can be used to separate the firms that are 
initially vertically integrated. Mandated divestiture forces the firm to sell part of its assets. Line-
of-business restriction precludes the vertically separated entities from entering into downstream 
businesses formerly occupied by the incumbent (see ICU, 2002, for more detailed discussion of 
these policy options in the case of telecommunications).
29 
Such policies are typically applied in newly liberalised network industries, such as utilities 
which originally featured vertically integrated incumbent firms. However, they can also be 
required by an antitrust authority as remedies for a horizontal merger to be allowed. Separation 
 
28 In statistics, the terms Type I and Type II errors are used in a hypothesis test. A Type I error occurs when the null 
hypothesis is rejected when it is in fact true; a Type II error occurs when the null hypothesis is not rejected when it is in fact 
false.  
29 In addition to structural separation, there are also less strong forms of separation, such as legal, functional or account 
separation. These latter forms are typically used to facilitate access regulation, which we discuss later.   61 
serves to increase independence of the (bottleneck) network facility from the firms providing 
services over the network and facilitates competition among service providers.  
Structural separation policies require careful assessment of costs and benefits. The benefits 
of improved competition should be weighed against the efficiency losses (e.g., lessened 
coordination, duplication of some activities and unexploited economies of scope).
30 The cost of 
the implementation of structural separation may be significant.
31 Therefore, this policy option is 
applied in last resort when it is hard to develop other measures that would prevent foreclosure. 
In some cases a milder form of structural policies can be used as a demand that the essential 
facility is jointly owned by all users. (Rey and Tirole, 2003). 
Empirical finding about mandated vertical separation 
 
Some empirical analyze the welfare effects of regulatory interventions in vertically related markets. When a regulator 
believes that vertical integration in a market amplifies the risk of abusing (especially horizontal) market power, it may opt 
for vertical separation. The most common example where divestiture has already happened is the gasoline market 
where different types of vertical contracts exist depending on whether the refiner or the gasoline station owns the whole 
vertical chain or they share it. In these cases the competition authority estimated that vertical separation (e.g. changing 
contract from a fully refiner owned vertical structure to a mixed structure) may result in higher efficiency. However 
empirical studies find that mandated divorcement systematically reduced or did not improve consumer surplus: either 
retail  prices  or  costs  got  higher  (see  Vita  (2000),  Blass  and  Carlton  (2001),  Hastings  (2004),  and  for  summary 
Lafontaine and Slade (2005) and Cooper et al., 2006). On the other hand, as it is estimated in Blass and Carlton (2001), 
imposing vertical separation had significantly high costs. Similar results are found when a regulator mandated vertical 
restraints (compiled in Lafontaine and Slade, 2005). 
Asker  (2004b)  also  analyzes  the  effect  of  regulatory  intervention  on  welfare.  He  derives  slightly  different 
conclusions, claiming that ex post assessment of vertical restraints might still lead to an effective decision of vertical 
separation according to the case-by-case doctrine. In counterfactual experiments based on his dataset and prior results 
in the beer market, Asker shows that one has to take into consideration what the source of, for instance, lower costs is 
in the presence of exclusive agreements. According to his analysis, when cost efficiency is gained by investments due 
to  stronger  incentives,  mandating  exclusive  contracts  to  be  terminated  may  decrease  consumer  surplus  and  total 
industry profit. Nonetheless, if foreclosure yields cost advantage for the incumbent, then intervention may succeed in 
increasing welfare. Asker suggests that if after understanding the economic rationale of exclusive dealing it is revealed 
that brewers have been contracted for pure foreclosing reasons, the current case-by-case approach in regulatory policy 
can be an effective means to increase social welfare. 
To summarize, even though mandating vertical restraints or divorcement may be detrimental to consumer welfare, 
after assessing carefully the effects of foreclosure, and also the reasons what lead to a particular market outcome (e.g. 
low production costs), the case-by-case approach may be still kept in a hold in order to increase welfare if needed. 
Since possessing market power or restricting competition are not per se detrimental to welfare, therefore a case has to 
be judged after assessing all potential pro- and anti-competitive effects, and concluding whether the latter outweigh the 
former.  
 
30 See Mulder et al. (2005) for economic analysis of costs and benefits for the case of the structural separation of the Dutch 
energy industry. 
31 Rey and Tirole (2003) also argue that there may be a situation in which it is profitable for the firm to voluntarily divest 
certain assets in order to foreclose new entrants.    62 
Access regulation  
In addition to structural policies, there are also less intrusive policies that do not interfere with 
the industrial structure but restrict actions of the integrated owner of a bottleneck facility (or 
bottleneck input). Access regulation (also called third party access regulation, or TPA-
regulation) is such a policy measure. Access regulation is often used in newly liberalised 
industries to ensure (non-discriminative) access of new entrants to the bottleneck facility, which 
is typically vertically integrated with the incumbent supplier. The main instruments that are 
used in this case are access quantity regulation, access price regulation and price linkages.  
Access quantity regulation imposes the requirement on the integrated incumbent to open a 
certain part of its capacity to other players. For example, European Commission required each 
operator of Eurotunnel (British rail and SNCF) to allocate 25% of its capacity to new entrants 
for passenger and freight services.  
Access price regulation means that the regulator sets the maximum tariffs that can be 
charged by the facility. For example, price regulation has been applied for regional electricity 
distribution networks and for telecommunication networks in the EU. Price regulation ensures 
efficient pricing of services, preventing partial forms of foreclosure through raising the cost of 
rivals. Yet, there may be situations in which price regulation is not desirable because price 
restrictions may undermine incentives to invest in expanding the facility or in the development 
of new technology.  
Access regulation can take a more mild form of the so-called “mandated price linkages”, 
when the regulator defines the rule to set tariffs. Typically, the Efficient Component Pricing 
Rule is used (ECPR, or Baumol-Willig rule), which consists in the requirement that the access 
price charge to competitors should not exceed the price charged by the integrated firm on the 
competitive segment minus the incremental cost of that firm in the competitive segment. 
However, the ECPR rule only partly addresses the problem (Rey and Tirole (2003)). In an 
unregulated environment, it does not prevent the possibility for the integrated firm to exercise 
its market power by setting high prices on the final good, and thus set high access charges, 
precluding new entry.  
Access regulation is less intrusive than structural separation policies. On the negative side, 
because of the information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated firm, regulation 
may not always achieve the desirable effect. For example, a regulated vertically-integrated 
incumbent may mislead the regulator regarding its costs, and hence, to receive too generous 
tariffs on its regulated activity. This may allow this firm to price its unregulated businesses 
somewhat below the level of competitors in order to deteriorate the competitive position of 
rivals or even to force them to exit the market. In addition to this, vertically integrated firms 
may be able to raise rivals’ costs by using non-price discrimination practices. While prices and 
quantities are generally observable and relatively easy to monitor, soft discrimination practices,   63 
such as sabotage or quality degradation, are difficult to detect. Monitoring the behaviour of the 
firms is rather difficult and can involve significant regulatory cost and effort.  
Common carrier policies  
In some industries, third party access can be arranged in such a way that upstream firms receive 
the possibility to sell their products or services directly to consumers. In this case, the structure 
of industry ‘turns upside down’. This type of policies are applied in industries with 
complimentary goods and called ‘common carrier policy’. 
A common carrier is an organization transporting some product or service, which offers its 
service to general public. This term initially referred to traditional transportation companies, but 
later was extended to companies transporting services, such as telecommunication, and public 
utilities. Previously, in order to buy the product or service, consumers always had to deal with 
these transportation companies directly. However, the situation has been changing: consumers 
now deal directly with the suppliers of these products and services, while the transportation 
network (‘common carrier’) keeps its transportation function. In this way, the vertical structure 
has been turned upside down, so that upstream firms can sell to customers directly, instead of 
selling the good through downstream firms. 
According to the theory, a price increase is more likely if the bottleneck is located 
downstream, rather than upstream. This provides a rationale for common carrier policies, which 
reverse the structure and move a more competitive segment downstream (Rey and Tirole, 
2003). An example of the implementation of common carrier policies is Order 436 in the US, 
which created the possibility for gas producers to directly contract with the customers rather 
than stay mere suppliers to pipelines, who then sell it to customers in a bundle with transport.  
Banning certain types of vertical contracts 
This policy option is relevant for industries exhibiting characteristics under which specific 
vertical contracts increase the risk of foreclosure. For example, banning could be applied to 
exclusive contracts, tied sales, rebates, MFN-contracts, etc. See chapter 4 for some examples of 
antitrust cases that were concerned with such contracting practices.  
However, these restraints may have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects. 
Therefore, similarly to the case of vertical merger assessments, the rule of reason should be 
applied in evaluating them: “what really matters is not the restraint used but the context in 
which it is used and the goal it is supposed to achieve” (Rey and Vergé, 2005).  
The current European practice is stricter with respect to price restraints (such as RPM) than 
with respect to non-price restraints (such as exclusive contracts). Certain price restraints are 
banned per se. For example, RPM with minimum prices are banned completely (but maximum 
prices and recommended prices are evaluated under the rule of reason). The attitude towards 
non-price restraints, such as exclusive provisions, has been rather lenient. On the one hand,   64 
exclusive purchasing clauses are seen as impediments to competition, thus, they fall under 
Article 81(1) of the competition law. On the other hand, they are often exempted based on 
Article 81(3), granting exemption to franchises in which the obligation not to buy from an 
alternative supplier is needed to protect the identity or reputation of the network or intellectual 
property (see Rey and Vergé (2005) for more detail on this topic).  
It is important to realise that different types of restraints can be substitutes to each other, e.g. 
exclusive outcome can be also achieved by ‘non-exclusive contracts’ (e.g. non-linear pricing
32). 
Therefore, the option of banning of a particular type of vertical restraints should be evaluated 
within the right policy context and be consistent with other policies. 
Non-discrimination requirements 
Non-discrimination requirements can be imposed by the government or the regulator to ensure 
that vertically related firms treat their competitors upstream or downstream in the same manner 
as the firms to which they are vertically related. This is a more generic measure than access 
regulation or banning a certain type of contracts. It is also less intrusive, because the regulator 
does not prescribe which contractual or pricing practices the firm may apply and which not. 
Sometimes regulatory rules promote non-discriminative pricing, for example, the rule 
obliging the bottleneck firm to charge the same access price to all users or charge a single per-
unit price. Such rules however may have a perverse effect: “they benefit the upstream 
bottleneck because, by forcing the bottleneck to sell further unites at the same high price as the 
initial ones, they help the bottleneck commit not to flood the market” (Rey and Tirole, 2003). 
Therefore, these rules should be applied with great care. 
Ex-post enforcement of competition law 
In Europe, the EU Competition Law prohibits anticompetitive practices. This is covered by 
Articles 81 (banning practices that can distort competition in member-states, such as collusion) 
and 82 (abuse of dominant position). As we have mentioned earlier, Article 81 prescribes rules 
regarding certain types of vertical restraints, such as RPM and other price fixing practices, 
market sharing practices, etc.
33 It allows the competition authorities to eliminate practices 
triggering foreclosure. Article 82 fights abuses of market power by dominant firms. The recent 
discussion paper by DG COMP (see EC, 2005) opened the consultation round on the review of 
Article 82 for its application to exclusionary abuses. “By exclusionary abuses are meant 
 
32 For example, Rey and Vergé (2005) mention the antitrust case of Michelin. In 2001, Michelin was fined 20 mln euros for 
abuse of dominant position (Article 82) for using a system of rebates (which is a particular type of non-linear pricing) that 
induced distributors to buy exclusively from Michelin.  
33 Article 81 explicitly prohibits the following actions: “(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or 
sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them 
at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts.”   65 
behaviours by dominant firms which are likely to have a foreclosure effect on the market, i.e. 
which are likely to completely or partially deny profitable expansion in or access to a market to 
actual or potential competitors and which ultimately harm consumers. Foreclosure may 
discourage entry or expansion of rivals or encourage their exit”. The Commission is currently 
reflecting on the comments received from the public to determine the best approach to the 
review. Under Article 85, the European Commission has a power to track down and punish 
firms that violate these articles. Similar provisions are made in the national competition laws of 
the EU members. In cases when companies’ actions have lead to anti-competitive foreclosure, 
the competition authority can use these articles to restore competition ex post.  
There are pros and cons of waiting for foreclosure to manifest in a form that can be 
mitigated by means of these articles of the Competition law, instead of acting more proactively 
and eliminating the possibility of foreclosure ex ante. These pros and cons relate to the errors of 
Type I (prohibiting a good merger) and Type II (allowing a bad merger to take place) discussed 
in the section on merger control. Ex-post approach is in line with the believe that errors of Type 
I are more likely and expensive for the society than Type II errors.  
Disclosure requirements 
The requirement to publicly disclose contracts for intermediate goods helps to achieve more 
transparency in contracts of suppliers. This requirement by itself does not preclude charging 
different tariffs from different firms, yet decreasing information asymmetry may help prevent 
foreclosure by promoting competition downstream. (Rey and Tirole, 2003.) It should be noted 
that in addition to this positive effect on competition in the downstream market, transparency 
can have a negative effect on competition in the upstream market, since publicly observed 
contracts facilitate commitment to monopoly prices and also may facilitate coordination and 
collusion among the producers of the intermediate good. See Albæk et al. (1997) for an 
example in which transparency facilitated collusion among producers of concrete. Therefore, 
the overall effect of this measure should be assessed before applying it.    66 
Table 4.3  Different policy measures in mitigating foreclosure 







           
Structural separation policies    very high  one-off  low  may exacerbate potential 
hold-up problems 
           
Merger control    high  one-off  low  vertical contracts may 
substitute  
           
Access regulation    high  permanent  high  may provide incentive to 
mislead the regulator or to 
engage in sabotage 
           
Common carrier policies    high  permanent  low  often not applicable 
           
Banning certain types of vertical restraints    medium  permanent  low   risk of substitution 
between types of 
contracts  
           
Ex-post enforcement of competition law    low  permanent  high  may come too late 
           
Non-discrimination requirements     low  permanent  low  may facilitate commitment 
to high prices or low 
quantities 
           
Disclosure requirements    very low   permanent  low  may facilitate collusion 
 
Conclusions 
The discussion in this section highlighted two different perspectives of looking at a foreclosure 
problem: the antitrust policy perspective and the regulatory perspective. From the antitrust 
perspective, the question of policy intervention is only raised if there are signs of (potential) 
anticompetitive behaviour; while from the regulatory perspective, the intervention is justified in 
any situation in which policy intervention will improve welfare (consumer welfare or total 
welfare depending on the particular industrial context and political preferences). These 
perspectives are confronted with each other in making choice towards more and less proactive 
and stringent approach to foreclosure. The latter types of policies are represented by stringent 
merger control, structural separation policies, while the antitrust perspective leans more towards 
ex-post competition policies.  
Based on the discussion of the policy options provided in this chapter, we can see that policy 
differ in many aspects. Therefore, when comparing policies, trade-offs should be made with 
respect to their intrusiveness (affecting productive efficiency), complexity, one-off as well as 
systematic costs associated with their implementation. Table @ highlights these trade-offs. For 
example, structural policies, such as structural separation and merger control, are very intrusive, 
but also relatively simple to implement and highly effective in establishing separation among 
companies and eliminating the incentive to foreclose rivals in order to maximise the joint profits   67 
of the companies. Therefore, no systematic costs are needed for monitoring the behaviour of the 
companies. All these factors should be taken into account. 
Note, since foreclosure can arise not only in the case of vertical integration, but also based 
on certain contractual arrangements among the companies, structural policies alone may be 
ineffective. Therefore, an integral assessment is needed when choosing a relevant policy in each 
particular case. In this integral assessment, attention should be paid to the institutional 
framework currently applied, because foreclosure may have been facilitated by idle regulation 
or a policy restriction, in which case removing that restriction may already solve the problem.  
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5  Case studies 
5.1  Antitrust cases 
Below we discuss in some detail two antitrust cases concerning exclusive agreements where the 
potential for foreclosure has been assessed by competition authorities or by courts, and relate 
them to the theory discussed in chapter 2.  
Langnese-Iglo / Schöller v. European Commission / Mars: The ice-cream market in 
Germany 
As a reaction to a complaint by Mars, in 1992 the EC decided to forbid the use of exclusive 
contracts between ice-cream retailers and two leading producers, Langnese and Schöller, in the 
German market. The contracts specified exclusive dealing of the products of Langnese and 
Schöller and were often coupled to a loan financing the purchase of freezer cabinets in which 
only the ice-cream manufacturer’s products were to be stored. The judgment was based on the 
infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty. Langnese and Schöller appealed against the decision, 
but the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of the EC in 1998. The type of foreclosure 
that potentially arises is customer foreclosure, because other upstream ice-cream producers are 
prohibited to deliver to downstream retailers with exclusive contracts. In our analysis we partly 
draw on a discussion by Motta (2004) of the Langnese and Schöller cases  
The relevant market defined by the EC covers the ice-cream produced in industrial process 
(77% of total sales in 1990), and it is further restricted to products sold in individual portions. 
This definition is based on the facts that these products are the most relevant determinants of 
"impulse" purchases and the majority of exclusive deals are used in this market segment. For 
these products manufacturers have to make investments to keep the ice-cream at low 
temperature during various stages of the production procedure, especially at the end of the 
production chain. Even though 14 manufacturers were present in the German market in 1991, 
Langnese and Schöller held respectively 45 and 20% of the relevant market.  
Stylized model 
A stylized description of the market would be as follows. The downstream market consists of 
many local markets that are competitive, there is no vertical integration. Products are 
differentiated, and there are upstream entry barriers because it is necessary to establish a 
distribution chain and to build up a brand reputation. It is not known how high these entry 
barriers are, i.e., how costly establishing a distribution chain or brand reputation is. 
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Upstream there are many firms, some of which are large foreign ice-cream producers (like for 
example the complainant Mars), but as a result of brand differentiation producers may enjoy 
some market power. Therefore the upstream market is an oligopoly. 
Exclusive agreements can be best described by non-linear contracts in the sense that besides 
the per unit price the retailer has to pay a loan for using the freezer. Contracts can be 
renegotiated, but the contracts of different retailers do not expire simultaneously.   
(1) Is there market power upstream or downstream? 
The upstream market is an oligopoly and the downstream market is competitive. If the EC 
definition of the relevant market is correct, market shares are high, which may point towards 
market power upstream. However, Motta (2004) argues, the EC definition is not complete since 
due to different production technologies, close substitutes such as ice-cream sold in bulk 
(scooping ice-cream) and craft traded ice-cream are excluded from it. If these substitute 
products have also been considered, upstream shares would drop approximately by a half. 
(2) Is anticompetitive foreclosure likely? 
If there are economies of scale to ice-cream production and distribution, Langnese and Schöller 
may use exclusive agreements to deter entry of their rivals, because they have a first mover 
advantage, even though retailers would benefit from more intensive upstream competition. 
Upstream producers would then exploit the inability of retailers to coordinate their actions. 
If we believe the EC market definition to be correct and if we accept that there exist 
sufficient economies of scale, the theory predicts customer foreclosure, aimed at excluding 
upstream rivals. The Commission concluded that due to high fixed costs and already existing 
exclusive contracts, it has been difficult to enter the industrial impulse ice-cream market, 
therefore exclusive agreements might have foreclosed upstream entrants. Moreover, the demand 
of retailers was fragmented since the number of retailers was high, and therefore each retailer 
carried little bargaining power and was unable to coordinate with its rivals. In this case each 
exclusive contract signed with the incumbents decreases the number of potential outlets the 
entrant could contract with, thus making foreclosure even more likely. However, in this 
argument the Commission ignored the fact that brokers, offering full range of products to 
retailers have some market power too, thus making entry by some niche products possible. 
(3) Are there offsetting welfare effects? 
During the analysis the EC focused mainly on assessing the anti-competitive effects which are 
related to entry barriers. Pro-competitive effects, on the other hand, were less extensively 
assessed. In the relevant ice-cream market two types of exclusive agreements exist. First outlet 
exclusivity, which implies that the manufacturer requires the retailer to sell only its own 
products in the outlet; and second freezer exclusivity which implies that the manufacturer leases   71 
freezers to the outlet and requires the retailer to store only its own products there. Freezer 
exclusivity is not necessarily accompanied with outlet exclusivity. Manufacturers' investments 
in freezers caused considerable growth in the market, because these made it possible to 
introduce more products in outlets. If we assume that manufacturers have an advantage in 
financing the freezers compared to retailers, freezer exclusivity could be used to protect these 
investments from free-riding of other brands, providing an efficiency rationale for freezer 
exclusivity. This may be the case if retailers are more risk avers than manufacturers or is if 
manufacturers can buy freezers more cheaply. If there is no such advantage, retailers can 
appropriate the additional profits from investing in freezers themselves. This would invalidate 
the efficiency argument. 
However it is more difficult to find convincing efficiency rationale for outlet exclusivity. 
The only reasoning parties used in court was that it lowers distribution costs which otherwise 
would be higher due to competition that decreases demand for its own product. By solely 
questioning the competitive nature of the market, this argument provides weak evidence for 
pro-competitive effects of outlet exclusivity. 
(4) What are the policy options? 
In this case competition law was enforced ex post and the contracts were banned. 
Toys “R” Us v. Federal Trade Commission: The toys market in the US 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) condemned Toys “R” US (TRU) for abuse of dominant 
position and exclusive dealing in 1996. According to the FTC, TRU, a giant retailer owning 
20% market share in the toy industry, acted as the coordinator of a horizontal agreement among 
toy manufacturers (including the two main ones, Hasbro and Mattel). This horizontal agreement 
formed a network of vertical contracts between the TRU and the independent manufacturers. 
Each vertical agreement aimed at limiting the distribution of a manufacturer’s products to low-
priced warehouse club stores, on the condition that other manufacturers would do the same 
(“warehouse policy”). The FTC required TRU to terminate its exclusive contracts and not to 
enter new ones, and the decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2000. Potentially 
the type of foreclosure that emerges is input foreclosure, where a refusal to supply other 
warehouses might exclude them from the toy retail market. Our analysis is based on the FTC 
(2000) case and the summary of the case in Rey and Verge (2005). 
At the retailers’ level, toys are sold in different kinds of stores: (i) traditional toy stores and 
department stores (high-end, selling with 40 to 50% markup), (ii) specialized discount stores 
(selling at an average of 30% mark-up), (iii) general discounters like Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and 
Target (with 22% mark-up), and (iv) warehouse clubs like Costco and Pace (low-price end of 
market and selling with 9% markup). Since for longer time TRU has been present and   72 
possessed strong position in the low-price-end of toy sales market, this latter segment 
constitutes the main focus of this case.  
Although a club is selling exclusively to its members and prefers name-brand 
merchandizing, it intends to provide products of all manufacturers so that the consumers can 
easily compare its prices with its rivals’ prices. Due to this strategy, clubs’ market shares in 
total toy sales increased from 1.5% to 1.9% within a year. Worrying about losing its market 
share in the low-price-end segment, in 1992 TRU introduced its “warehouse policy” towards 
the manufacturers (FTC, 2000): “(i) the clubs could have no new or promoted product unless 
they carried the entire line, (ii) all specials and exclusives to be sold to the clubs had to be 
shown first to TRU to see if TRU wanted the item, (iii) old and basic product had to be in 
special packs, (iv) clearance and closeout items were permissible provided that TRU was given 
the first opportunity to buy the product, and (v) there would be no discussion about prices.” 
These exclusive agreements were negotiated individually.  
Stylized description 
The toy market can be characterized as follows. On the one hand the relevant downstream 
market contains warehouse clubs. This market counted more than 600 club stores in 1992, none 
of them vertically integrated to manufacturers. Due to their name-brand merchandizing activity, 
their brands are differentiated. On the other hand, for a long time, TRU had enjoyed a strong 
position at the low-price-end retail market segment, because its only competition arose from 
traditional toy stores who target at a different consumer segment, reflected in their higher 
prices, and from general discounters, which could not offer similar product variety as TRU, yet 
pricing somewhat higher than TRU. 
Upstream there are a few manufacturers producing differentiated toys: two big companies, 
Mattel and Hasbro have 12% market share in traditional toys sales, and share the market with a 
few other big manufacturers such as Fisher Price and Tyco. This market is an oligopoly. 
According to the FTC, with its exclusive agreements TRU orchestrated a boycott in which 
key manufacturers agreed to join "on the condition that their competitors would do the same". 
In other words, manufacturers colluded in relation to sales in warehouse clubs. 
(1) Is there market power upstream or downstream? 
Before the exclusive agreements, the downstream market had a competitive segment, that is 
warehouse clubs and a player with first mover advantage and market power, that is TRU and 
the upstream market exhibited imperfect competition. After contracting with manufacturers 
TRU was able to gain its market share back and drive manufacturers into horizontal 
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(2) Is anticompetitive foreclosure likely? 
In this case theory suggests that anticompetitive input foreclosure is likely: for the dominant 
producers exclusive sales allow them to extract full market power rents from the market 
(avoiding intrabrand competition). These rents can be shared with the favoured retailer. In 
addition, as pointed out, the agreements might have facilitated horizontal collusion upstream. 
As FTC claimed, by its warehouse policy “TRU sought to eliminate the competitive threat the 
clubs posed by denying them merchandise, forcing the clubs' customers to buy products they 
did not want, and frustrating customers' ability to make direct price comparisons of club prices 
and TRU prices." As a result, within 3 years clubs’ sales shares dropped from 1.9% to 1.4% in 
the total US toy market and the products of coordinating manufacturers disappeared from these 
shops. 
(3) Are there offsetting welfare effects? 
TRU referred to entering exclusive agreements due to potential free riding on its distribution 
efforts, however the FTC could not find evidence for it. In the toy market manufacturers paid 
each retailer directly for the services they wanted the retailer to furnish, including advertising, 
full-line product stocking, and extensive inventories. Therefore the FTC concluded that 
exclusive dealing was entered with clear anti-competitive purposes. 
(4) What are the policy options? 
In the TRU case the competition law was applied ex post, and FTC obliged parties to terminate 
the contracts. 
5.2  Case study: Electricity market 
This case focuses on the electricity sector. This market has a long history of regulation, 
motivated by the natural monopoly characteristics of parts of the sector. Is fear of 
anticompetitive vertical foreclosure a concern in this sector, and should regulation take this risk 
into account? We first give a brief overview of the sector, and next apply the policy framework 
to assess risks of anticompetitive foreclosure. 
Stylized description 
In the electricity market, the main segments to be distinguished are generation, retail, and 
transport. The generation sector consists of power production plants. Economies of scale in this 
sector have gone down as the size of viable new facilities has decreased. As the sector was no 
longer viewed as natural monopoly, in many countries liberalisation of the generation market 
has taken place. With a growing emphasis on renewables and small-scale distributed generation, 
the reduction in scale for new entry may further continue. Retail comprises sales of energy to   74 
smaller end-users. Larger, industrial users can often access the wholesale market for electricity 
without assistance from retail intermediaries. 
While generation and retail provide a clear example of a vertically organised sector where 
vertical foreclosure might play a role, we focus in this case study on the role of the electricity 
networks: the transportation and distribution parts of the electricity chain. Both are usually 
considered (regional) natural monopolies, as large economies of scale make duplication of 
networks non-economical. Transportation refers to the high voltage transmission grids, which 
connect (large) generators to distribution grids and some very large end-users. Transmission 
networks in different countries or regions also interconnect with each other, providing access 
for producers or traders in neighbouring zones. In Europe, the functions of the transmission 
companies typically also comprise of systems operations, apart from pure transportation of 
energy. The system operator’s role is coordination, in (near) real-time, of generation and 
consumption decisions, making sure the two remain balanced. In the current liberalised 
generation market this usually involves operating a balancing mechanism or market.
34 
The term distribution networks refers to the more finely meshed lower voltage grids 
distributing the energy from the high-voltage grid to end-consumers. In relation to the tendency 
in the generation market of smaller scale and more distributed generation, distribution networks 
may also play an increasingly important role in connecting to generating units. One may think 
of the feeding-in of electricity locally produced by wind generation, by photovoltaic cells on 
rooftops of individual consumers, or as technology progresses, perhaps produced domestically 
by household scale gas-fired combined heating and power appliances.  
Vertical market structure  
Are networks part of a vertically organised chain in the electricity sector? To answer this 
question, we first observe that networks sell two distinct products: rights to withdraw electricity 
from the network (for consumers or their agents), and rights to feed electricity into the network 
(for producers, or for market parties operating in different regions)
35. On the consumer side, the 
network sells its connection services directly to consumers, and retailers sell the electricity 
directly to consumers. The relation between networks and retailers may therefore be 
characterised as a horizontal relationship, rather than a vertical one, and we will therefore not 
focus on the network-retailer interactions.  
The other product, access for producers, is more appropriately described as part of a vertical 
chain. Producers sell their electricity into the wholesale market, and have to acquire, as a 
necessary input, connection to a network. In this relationship, the network is the upstream 
player and the producer the downstream player. In investigating the potential for 
anticompetitive foreclosure we focus on this part of the electricity market.  
 
34 In the US, ownership of networks and system operation are more commonly separated. 
35 We here ignore the system operations part of the network’s activities   75 
(1) Is there market power?  
As mentioned before, networks are (natural) monopolies: producers connecting in a specific 
region have no choice in access provider. When a producer chooses where to locate, there may 
be some competition between networks, though, provided various networks offer access to the 
same wholesale market for energy. (This is generally the case for distribution networks: 
irrespective of which region within the country the small producer is located (and hence, of 
which local network he connects to), he can sell his energy on the national wholesale market.) 
Theoretically such a producer could condition its location choice (and hence, its choice of input 
provider of network access) on the terms of access provision for each network. In practice, 
however, for an individual small-scale producer connecting to the distribution grid there is often 
no flexibility in location choice, as the production opportunity is connected to a particular 
location (consider e.g. a factory building a cogeneration plant, or a household choosing to 
install photovoltaic panels). We will therefore consider the upstream sector, the network, as a 
monopoly. 
The downstream sector (in the terminology explained above) is that of generation of 
electricity. This sector is currently, in Europe, often characterised as an oligopoly, manifesting 
imperfect competition (see e.g. CPB, 2006, for an overview, or EC, 2007, for a detailed analysis 
of market power in the European wholesale market). Imperfect competition may originate from 
entry barriers to new players, and also from constraints in cross-border transmission capacity, 
segmenting the geographic market into, mostly, individual countries and reducing competitive 
pressure from abroad. 
(2a) Analysis of anticompetitive foreclosure in the absence of regulation 
As indicated above, regulation of the electricity networks is widespread, as a response to 
various market failures. Nevertheless, we first address the question of whether anticompetitive 
foreclosure would be likely in a hypothetical situation where such regulation is absent. Next we 
address how the presence of regulation itself might alter the analysis, and to what extent this 
regulation is also a good policy response to foreclosure.  
According to the policy framework, we first note that, indeed, market power is present, with 
a monopolistic (upstream) network sector, and an oligopoly in the downstream generation 
market. We pursue the analysis by distinguishing a situation with, and without vertical 
integration. Both situations occur in reality: in the Netherlands, as in various other countries, the 
transmission grid is an independent firm from the generation sector. In some other European 
countries, transmission is vertically integrated with generation companies. Regional networks 
are often integrated with generation. 
Consider first the situation without vertical integration. In the absence of (price) regulation, 
according to the checklist, we would be in the situation where there is a risk of input foreclosure 
(i.e. generators could be excluded from the market), but not customer foreclosure. The network   76 
would try to exercise its monopoly power towards generators, charging monopoly prices. In 
doing so, however, it would be vulnerable to risk of opportunistic behaviour: after contracts had 
been struck with generators for access to the network, the network operator might find it 
profitable to make additional profits by providing additional network capacity (or, for instance, 
expanding interconnection capacity with neighbouring markets). Anticipating the undermining 
of their competitive position ex post, generators would be reluctant to pay monopoly prices to 
the network. Some way of commitment by the network operator, to preserving their competitive 
position would be called for, such as exclusive contracts
36.  
With vertical integration of the network into the generation market, the network can more 
easily commit not to (over)supply the market with access to transmission. Its own stake in the 
generation market allows it to credibly refuse to give access to independent generators, as this 
would undermine its own profits from selling energy. Foreclosure is then a risk. 
(2b) Anticompetitive foreclosure and regulation 
The previous analysis illustrates the general analysis proposed in this document, but in this case 
is largely hypothetical since in reality networks are usually regulated to prevent them from 
reaping the monopoly rents from their natural monopoly position. Typically, regulation 
involves both access price regulation and requirements to provide access to third parties on non-
discriminatory terms. Foreclosure to protect monopoly rents from the network may seem less 
relevant, since such rents may be reduced as a result of regulation anyway. 
Consider first the situation without vertical integration. Note first that, if there is no price 
regulation but there is a requirement of providing non-discriminatory access, the monopoly 
problem is increased: the non-discrimination requirement allows the network to commit to 
charging the same, monopoly, prices to all connected generators. The network does not suffer 
from a risk of opportunistic behaviour and as a consequence needs no input foreclosure to 
safeguard its monopoly profits. It is therefore essential to also regulate the price at which access 
is given. Provided the regulated price at least equals the costs of connecting generators, there 
will be no incentive to deny access to generators, and more strongly, if the price is set (slightly) 
too high, the network will have an incentive to provide as much access as it can. Foreclosure is 
then no more a concern. 
The situation is different in the presence of vertical integration: the network operator then 
internalises the loss of profits of increased competition on the generation market. Assume again 
that the network is subject to access regulation, including regulation of price and non-
discriminatory access provision to third-party generators. If regulation would be perfect, clearly 
there would be little remaining problem, and foreclosure would not occur. 
 
36 An alternative solution could appear to be that connection contracts are short term (or renegotiable), so that they can be 
updated when competitive conditions alter. This would however create hold-up problems, since both network and generator 
make large relation-specific upfront investments.    77 
In reality though, there may be large information asymmetries between regulator and integrated 
firm, in particular regarding capacity to provide access, and, related, the costs of increasing this 
capacity. Claims that capacity is insufficient to accommodate (rival) generators will be costly to 
verify for the regulator, and similarly it will be very hard for the regulator to make sure that, 
say, a national transmission operator makes every effort to make all investments in cross-border 
interconnection capacity that are (socially) efficient. In spite of regulation, anticompetitive 
foreclosure may still remain. 
 
(3) Are there welfare enhancing effects of foreclosure? 
Can there be welfare enhancing effects of foreclosure, or more generally vertical integration? 
Perhaps the most important factor would be enhanced coordination between network operation 
and investment when fewer generators can be active in the market, and a lower risk of hold-up 
in case of vertical integration. At the operational level, transaction costs of system balancing 
may increase with number of market players, as would coordination of maintenance on 
networks and generation. (As a counterargument, incentives for efficiency in balancing will be 
higher under increased competition). In the long run, similarly, issues of coordination for 
investment in network and generation may play a role. However, these arguments hold in 
particular for the extreme situation where foreclosure leads to generation monopoly, are 
unlikely to be relevant if foreclosure merely leads to generation oligopoly. In the extreme case, 
without regulation of the monopolist generator, these benefits seem unlikely to balance the 
disadvantages of monopoly.  
 
(4) What are the policy options? 
In the presence of price regulation foreclosure may remain a risk if there is vertical integration. 
This is due to the fact that there is significant asymmetric information, in particular in assessing 
available capacity and in deciding on new investments. Mandated vertical separation can 
provide a solution to such risks. This measure is currently proposed by the EC for transmission 
networks (and, in the Netherlands, for distribution networks as well). The principal question to 
answer then remains how large the costs are of such separation (e.g., loss of synergies), and 
how they compare to the risks of foreclosure (and, potentially, other risks). For such analyses 
for ownership unbundling in the Netherlands, see e.g. CPB (2005) and SEO (2006).  
5.3  Case study: Dutch Healthcare market 
In this case study, we evaluate the possibility of anticompetitive foreclosure in healthcare 
markets. We focus on interaction between insurers and hospitals. After briefly introducing the 
Dutch healthcare market, we describe a stylised model of vertical relations between hospitals 
and insurers. We analyze the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure in this model, illustrating how   78 
the framework can be applied in practice. Note however, that our analysis is not meant to 
capture the Dutch healthcare system in all its complexity. At the end, we list several factors that 
may be important to add to this basic case in order to make the analysis more applicable for the 
Dutch practice. An in depth evaluation of the effect of vertical integration in this market is the 
topic of separate research currently undertaken by the CPB. 
The Dutch healthcare market has recently been reformed. In 2006, the prices of some 
healthcare services (in the so-called B-segment) were liberalised and a new national insurance 
system was introduced. These changes pose new policy challenges with respect to vertical 
relations in this market. Two key features of the new Dutch healthcare model are free choice of 
the insurer by consumers and the possibility of selective contracting between insurers and 
providers of healthcare services (hospitals in this case).
37 Free choice of the insurer by 
consumers is backed up by an obligation on the side of insurers to accept customers at the same 
premium (this is known as community rating). This is meant to facilitate competition among 
insurers, stimulating them to select better providers. This will give providers incentives for 
better performance. In this way, the scheme is intended to achieve higher efficiency and quality 
of healthcare services. 
Insurers cannot differentiate prices of products across consumers who buy the same basic 
benefit package
38, except that they may charge higher prices for non-contracted services. Fully 
exclusive contracts are not feasible under the Dutch legislation, which stipulates that consumers 
should receive a ‘reasonable’ compensation for treatments in any hospital, including non-
contracted hospitals. The law is silent on what exactly constitutes reasonable compensation. 
Although there has been so far only two examples of strengthening of vertical relations 
between healthcare providers and insurers - the take-over of a share in a small orthopaedic 
clinics by the CZ insurance group and a financing contract between local GP’s by Menzis- the 
Dutch Competition Authority may be confronted with potential vertical mergers in the near 
future. Therefore it may also be useful to look at other countries’ experiences. See the textbox 
below on vertical relations in the US health market. 
 
 
37 We leave out the distinction between different types of health care providers. 
38 Group discounts are allowed.   79 
Vertical relations in the US healthcare market 
In the US, the extent of vertical integration increased in the last two decades. Its growth coincided with the growth of 
‘managed care’, which was driven by the desire to contain healthcare expenditures. Two main forms of managed care 
organisations  (MCO)  in  the  US  market  are  Health  Maintenance  Organisations  (HMO)  and  Preferred  Provider 
Organisations (PPO). Both these forms put restrictions on the choice of provider by their policy holders, in exchange for 
better  terms  from  these  providers.  Historically,  MCOs  arose  in  the  form  of  HMOs,  which  were  fully  integrated 
organisations that were signing exclusive contracts with their providers and restricting the choice of their subscribers to 
the contracted providers. The current trend is towards less exclusive forms such as a PPO, offering financial incentives 
to subscribers for choosing certain providers (Baranes and Bardey, 2004). 
 
Stylized model 
We consider the following model consisting of two related markets: the hospital market 
(‘upstream’) and the insurer market (‘downstream’). Consumers buy health insurance from 
health insurers, who contract healthcare with hospitals.  
We assume that hospitals are differentiated. In practice, the physical distance between the 
consumer’s home and the provider may restrict consumer choice: consumers are not always 
willing to travel to providers that are not located in the neighbourhood of their homes, partly 
because they do not feel monetary consequences of their actions, as the bill goes to the insurer 
anyway. In addition, hospitals may differ in quality or in healthcare services they offer. Besides, 
consumers may prefer to be treated by a particular doctor. Also they often follow advice of their 
GP
39, who typically directs them to a neighbouring hospital. 
About the insurance market, we assume that all insurers sell a standard benefit package,
40 
covering the same set of healthcare treatments. However, insurers can charge a co-payment if 
the insured chooses to be treated by a non-contracted provider. As long as insurers do not 
selectively contract with hospitals (i.e., they do not restrict consumer choice of the hospital) the 
product that they sell is homogeneous. If different insurers contract with different groups of 
hospitals, their insurance policies become differentiated, because the hospitals are 
differentiated. We will cover both types of situations in our analysis. For simplicity, we also 
assume zero switching costs in this market. Besides, we assume that insurers mainly compete 
on prices
41and therefore, we classify the competition in the insurance market as Bertrand 
competition.  
In short, we interpret the insurance firms as downstream firms selling to consumers a range 
of differentiated upstream products. The upstream products that they sell represent healthcare 
services offered by various hospitals, among which consumers can choose when they need 
healthcare. As long as all insurers offer access to all hospitals, their products can be seen as 
 
39 GP stands for “general practitioner” (“huisarts”). 
40 As the basic insurance package in the Netherlands. 
41 Especially in the beginning of the reform, price competition was very aggressive. In the first year, some insurers even 
priced their basic insurance products under their actual cost level (perhaps hoping that the consumers will stay with them for 
more years, so that they can eventually earn their money back). Douven and Schut (2006) estimate the losses of health 
insurers on basic insurance in 2006 between 375 and 950 mln euros.   80 
homogeneous, to the extent that the insurers themselves are non-differentiated. Of course, 
insurers may be differentiated because of, for example, different service levels. 
The general theory of vertical foreclosure presented in chapter 2 can be applied to the 
healthcare case if we realize that (i) the downstream firm pays to the upstream firm, and the 
consumer pays to the downstream firm only; and (ii) the downstream and upstream firms can 
use vertical contracts or integration. Although an integrated insurer cannot fully deter patients 
from going to another hospital, he can discourage this behaviour by offering financial incentives 
to consumers.
42 
Health economics literature on vertical relations 
In addition to the general economic literature discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there is also a health economics literature 
specifically addressing the issue of foreclosure in the healthcare market. Like the general literature, this literature also 
stresses that anticompetitive foreclosure is only possible if there is market power at least in one market segment, and 
that certain factors may mitigate or increase both positive and negative effects of foreclosure. 
In particular, Gaynor and Ma (1996) analyse a model with differentiated providers and homogeneous insurers. They 
show that as long as the insurance market is perfectly competitive, no anti-competitive effects arise from exclusive 
dealing. In the other words, exclusive dealing by itself does not create a problem. 
This means that for exclusive dealing to be anticompetitive there must be a situation in which there was market 
power in the insurance market initially. In particular, if we introduce market power in the insurance market by introducing 
differentiated insurers, then foreclosure can arise in equilibrium. (Gal-Or, 1996). This result arises in the model with two 
insurers and two hospitals. The insurers decide if they award exclusivity to a certain hospital or make offer to both 
hospitals, and subsequently negotiate the price. When an insurer excludes a certain hospital his bargaining position vis-
à-vis the remaining hospital improves, since this hospital may be willing to accept lower rates in exchange for higher 
volumes. Gal-Or obtains that if the probability to get sick is relatively low, and the extent of differentiation among 
hospitals is relatively small, then both insurers will contract the same hospital. 
Adverse selection plays an important role in healthcare. Baranes and Bardey (2004) argue that exclusive contracts 
combined with differentiated providers lead to segmentation of patient risk groups (horizontal differentiation), which 
works pro-competitively. In their model, the increase of the number of insurers with exclusive contracts leads to lower 
premiums of conventional insurers. This effect arises because in equilibrium, consumers with relatively high risks of 
sickness buy conventional insurance, which gives them access to all non-contracted hospitals; and consumers with 
lower risks go to insurers who contract a particular hospital. Since with a larger share of exclusive contracts, the range 
of  hospitals  available  to  the  patients  of  conventional  insurers  decreases,  the  premium  of  conventional  insurance 
decreases as well. 
 
 
42 To date, Dutch insurers hardly used this possibility to affect the choice of provider. (NZa, 2006, and CPB, 2007).   81 
We consider three situations: a basic model in which there are one regional hospital and 
multiple insurers, and two models that feature double oligopoly. The later two models represent 
the cases of homogeneous and differentiated insurance products: see Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.1  Stylised model 
  Model 1  
‘basic model’ 
Model 2  Model 3 
       
Hospital market  monopoly  oligopoly   oligopoly 
Insurance market  oligopoly  oligopoly  oligopoly 
Differentiated insurance products    no  yes 
 
Diagnostics of foreclosure 
Here we apply the framework developed in chapter 4 to assess the risk of foreclosure in this 
market. The framework includes four major questions, which we discuss below. 
(1) Is there market power upstream or downstream? 
In the ‘basic model’, we have assumed the hospital market to be a monopoly and the insurer 
market to be an oligopoly. Therefore, that situation is clearly characterised by the hospital 
market power (upstream). The downstream market (insurance) is competitive, since we assume 
product homogeneity and zero switching costs in this market. 
In model 2, the hospital market (upstream) is characterised by some market power, while the 
insurer market (downstream) is competitive. Hospital market power arises because of product 
differentiation and consumer preferences for a particular hospital. It decreases with a decrease 
in concentration and specialisation of hospitals.  
Model 3 introduces price differentiation in the insurer market, which creates market power 
in this market. Therefore, in Model 3 market power is present both upstream and downstream. 
 
(2) Is anticompetitive vertical foreclosure likely? 
In the ‘basic model’ with one regional hospital, there is a monopoly upstream. Therefore, there 
is a danger of input foreclosure. For example, a merger between the hospital and one insurer 
may potentially lead to input foreclosure (according to the general framework, see chapter 4). 
Customer foreclosure is not an issue, because there is only one upstream firm.  
Let us turn to models with several firms operating in each market. Economies of scale may 
be important in the hospital market, therefore, entry in this market would require a certain scale. 
According to our framework, the presence of scale economies may lead to customer foreclosure 
in Models 2 and 3, but this is not always the case. The general framework also does not provide 
us guidance regarding the possibility of input foreclosure in these models. Therefore more 
detailed modelling may be needed. It appears from the health economics literature that in the 
case of homogeneous insurers foreclosure is unlikely (Gaynor and Ma, 1997, see the textbox).   82 
In the case of differentiated insurers, customer foreclosure may be the case, if hospital products 
are not highly differentiated (Gal-Or, 1996).  
(3) Are there welfare enhancing effects? 
Foreclosure may have positive effects in the form of preventing double marginalisation, 
reducing free-rider effects, and facilitating specific investment. As we explain below, mainly 
the third effect (related to specific investment) has to be taken into account by anti-foreclosure 
policy. It is difficult assess the magnitude of this effect.  
Double marginalisation is unlikely to play a role in practice. In the non-regulated segment, 
non-linear contracts are allowed,
43 which potentially eliminates double marginalisation; and in 
the regulated segment, the prices are capped by the regulator. Also, the hospital products bought 
by the insurer can not be traded. 
Free-rider effects at the insurer level may appear important, for example in the context of 
prevention (of certain diseases). An insurance firm will only have incentive to invest in 
prevention if it can also appropriate the benefits. Foreclosure can be used as a mechanism to 
secure these benefits. However, there are also other possible instruments to achieve the 
necessary level of prevention (e.g. prevention could be organized at the level of the state, by 
mandating that firms have to contract certain level of prevention). 
Finally, vertical contracts or vertical integration may be needed to facilitate specific 
investment by hospitals. This argument seems to hold for hospital ICT-systems. Both the 
hospital and the insurer may benefit from better insights in costs and benefits of the treatments, 
but the hospital may have insufficient incentive to install it.  
 
(4) What are the policy options? 
It is likely that in the future the Dutch competition authority will be confronted with the 
necessity to assess mergers between insurers and hospitals. Special attention should be given to 
situations similar to Models 1 and 3 analysed here, in which there is a risk of input foreclosure, 
the negative effect of which (in the form of price increases) may exceed the positive effects in 
(facilitating specific investment). If this is the case, merger prohibition could be a relevant 
measure.  
With respect to potential effects of foreclosure policy on the level of innovations, we note 
that major technological innovations in the healthcare industry occur at the level of producers of 
medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, research centres and academic hospitals. The extent of 
innovations that would involve both a hospital and an insurer together is relatively small.
44 
 
43 However, linear pricing is currently applied in most cases. In the regulated segment, the prices are regulated by the NZa, 
and therefore, they are linear by definition. In the free segment, non-linear contracts are in principle allowed, but it seems 
that they actually have not been used. 
44 There is mainly the scope for contractual innovations (e.g. partial capitation), which may be important to reduce moral 
hazard of providers, in particular, to prevent supplier induced demand. However, here when speaking about dynamic effects, 
we focus on product and process innovations.   83 
Therefore, stringent anti-foreclosure policy in this market segment is unlikely to have strong 
negative dynamic effects. This implies that policy against foreclosure may be relatively more 
stringent (compared to cases with a high level of innovation, such as in the case study on the 
telecom sector considered in section 5.4). 
Concluding remarks  
We have used stylised models to highlight how vertical integration may cause foreclosure in 
this market and which factors are likely to play a role. Policy intervention (e.g. in the form of 
merger prohibition) would be needed to prevent foreclosure in such a case. In any application of 
the analysis presented in this chapter to the Dutch healthcare market, additional factors need to 
be taken into account, which were not included into our stylised model.
45 
 
1.  Heterogeneity of insurers  
In the analysis above, we assumed a standardised insurance product. In practice, however, in 
addition to the standardised basic insurance, insurers also sell non-standardised supplementary 
insurance.
46 This increases the degree of heterogeneity in this market. Higher degree of insurer 
heterogeneity increases the risk of foreclosure (Gal-Or, 1996, see the textbox presented earlier 
in this section). 
2.  Switching costs 
In our analysis we have ignored consumer switching costs, which are generally present in the 
insurance market (Pomp et al., 2004). So far, these costs were not prohibitively high in the 
Dutch market
47, however, this may change in the future. For example, switching costs may 
increase if companies introduce loyalty bonuses or begin to adopt stronger acceptance policies 
for supplementary insurance. With the presence of switching costs, entry into the insurance 
market becomes more difficult. Therefore, this market may become less competitive, which 
may increase the risk of foreclosure. 
 
3.  Soft discrimination 
We note that in practice, in addition to the foreclosure mechanisms that we discussed in the 
theoretical part, foreclosure can be also achieved through soft discrimination. For example, the 
hospital may give a preferential treatment (e.g. in terms of waiting time) to the affiliated insurer. 
 
4.  Community ratings 
 
45 A more detailed analysis of the effects of vertical integration in this market is the topic of ongoing research.  
46 There is no standardised benefit package for supplementary insurance. Insurers can charge different risk-premiums and 
can refuse some customers. Basic and supplementary insurance are often sold as a joint product. More than 90% of the 
compulsorily insured population buys supplementary health insurance from the same insurer where they buy basic 
insurance (Schut et al., 2007).  
47 The switching rate reached 20% in the year of the introduction of the new insurance scheme (Douven et al., 2007).    84 
  Our model does not consider interregional aspects, such as the effect of foreclosure in one 
region on the situation in other regions. Since in the Netherlands, insurers have to apply 
community ratings (i.e. the same rates should be offered to everybody ensured by the same 
insurance firm
48), a pricing strategy increasing the profit in one region may lead to losses in 
other regions. Inclusion of these effects into the model may change our results.  
 
5.  Effect of price regulation 
To date, less than 10% of hospital prices are liberalised, while the rest is regulated. Although 
the share of liberalised services will increase in the future, still, many healthcare services will 
remain under price regulation. Therefore, it is important to take the effect of regulation into 
account. 
  
5.4  Case study: Telecommunication markets 
Following the same structure as in the previous case studies, first we present a stylized 
description of the current Dutch telecommunications market. Based on this description, we 
apply the policy framework to analyze the risk of foreclosure is in this stylized version of the 
market, and discuss some policy options. Finally we mention potential developments in the 
market which may affect our analysis. This case study is based in part on a study of Bijlsma and 
van Dijk (2007). 
Stylized description 
A stylized version of the electronic communications markets in the Netherlands would consist 
of a downstream level where retailers compete for consumers in providing services (i.e. 
intrabrand or service-based competition) and an upstream level where network providers offer 
access to their networks (i.e. interbrand or facilities-based competition). At the upstream level, 
two firms are active that own a network with national coverage (KPN with its ADSL 
technology and regional cable operators) and are potentially able to provide wholesale network 
access to downstream retailers. Retailers need access to the networks to sell 
telecommunications services like broadband internet access, mobile or fixed telephony, and 
digital television to consumers (i.e. triple-play). The two upstream network suppliers are 
vertically integrated and compete through their subsidiaries in the downstream market with their 
non-integrated downstream rivals. Due to mandatory local loop unbundling (LLU) of KPN’s 
network downstream competition accommodated non-integrated firms thus making service-
based competition fiercer. 
In reality, upstream firms with limited local coverage (for example Lomboxnet) or networks 
only catering for corporate users (for example BBned or Versatel/Tele2) are also present in the 
 
48 Group discounts are allowed.   85 
Netherlands. In addition, there exist local initiatives for wireless networks (for example wireless 
Leiden). For simplicity we abstract from these features. Thus, we consider the 
telecommunications market in the Netherlands as a bilateral oligopoly with vertical integration. 
Upstream services offered by networks to retailers (transport of digital data) can in principle 
be considered as close substitutes, whereas the retail services offered to customers by 
downstream retailers are differentiated. Because the amount of data that fibre optic networks 
can carry is very large, there are no significant capacity constraints in the data flow.
49 In 
addition, digital techniques increasingly succeed in compressing data flows. Therefore, price 
competition (i.e. Bertrand competition) with differentiated goods is probably an accurate 
description of competition in the downstream market. 
Risk of foreclosure 
To assess the risk of foreclosure by means of contracting, we apply the framework discussed in 
chapter 4 to the previously described market. 
(1) Sufficient upstream and downstream competition? 
Whereas upstream there are two competing firms (i.e. the two firms owning a network with 
national coverage), at the downstream level potentially many retail firms offer services to 
consumers. In addition, with current technologies the investments necessary to role out a 
competing telecommunications network with national coverage are prohibitively high. Clearly, 
this is a market where potentially upstream market power exists, while downstream markets are 
potentially competitive. 
(2) Is anticompetitive vertical foreclosure likely? 
As both network owners have downstream affiliates, the market is one of full vertical 
integration. In the absence of regulation we would generally expect the contracts between 
entrant and vertically integrated suppliers to be nonlinear, for example with a fixed, and a 
variable part. Such contracts can often increase the joint profit of a network and a retailer 
compared to a simple linear price and it is unlikely that network capacity will be easily resold if 
the network owner contractually prohibits this. 
In a market with an upstream oligopoly, nonlinear private contracts, no capacity constraints, 
downstream differentiation and price competition, entrants will most likely not be excluded 
from the market, unless there is a large probability that entrants mainly steal market share from 
their supplier (so-called ‘own-product cannibalization’, Ordover and Shaffer, 2006). This effect 
might occur if consumers perceive services that are delivered through one type of infrastructure 
 
49 OPTA (2006) claims that there are capacity constraints because a network's administration may not be able to 
accommodate a large number of clients switching from one network to the other. This might indeed limit the potential rate of 
change in market shares. 
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as quite distinct from service over the other (upstream differentiation). In the absence of this 
effect, entrants will be able to enter into contracts with at least one of the network owners. 
These contracts may be exclusive, therefore foreclosure does occur. Nevertheless, if the 
networks compete in signing such exclusive contracts with retailers, the access price will be 
driven down to competitive levels. Hence in this case foreclosure is not detrimental to welfare. 
If the networks do not compete in signing such exclusive contracts and the number of potential 
downstream entrants is small, the access price may remain high. In this case, only one of the 
networks has incentives to provide entry and it will do so at high prices. Foreclosure is then 
anticompetitive. Conversely, if the number of potential entrants is high, the possibility to charge 
high prices is eroded by the usual commitment problem (see chapter 2) and prices will drop to 
competitive levels. 
(3) Offsetting welfare enhancing effects? 
In this market, double marginalization is unlikely, as both suppliers and retailer can use non-
linear contracts to prevent this. Also firm specific investments by suppliers or retailers with free 
rider effects do not appear to be important. The one remaining efficiency argument that may 
play a role is the hold-up argument, given the specific investments that have to be made to 
connect to either infrastructure. 
(4) What are the policy options? 
If competition between both infrastructures is deemed too low, according to the current EU 
regulatory framework a network operator having significant market power over its 
infrastructure is obliged to provide access to rivals at a cost-based access price. Access 
regulation was successfully introduced in the Netherlands in the sense that it intensified service-
based competition when the upstream market was characterized by a monopoly network. 
However in the presence of competing networks access obligation currently implies asymmetric 
regulation: access to only one of the networks (the former telephony network) is regulated. 
Asymmetric regulation may distort the competition between  networks by leading to lock-in 
effects. Symmetric regulation may therefore be more beneficial and can take two forms: either 
regulating both networks or doing nothing. 
The telecommunications market in other EU countries differs strongly from the Dutch 
market. In countries where there exists an upstream monopoly, e.g. in the UK or Germany. We 
briefly discuss the policy tools that are used to intensify competition there. The operational 
separation of local access and backhaul networks of British Telecom into OpenReach was 
carried out as a result of Ofcom's market review. Other examples may follow this decision (e.g. 
cases of Telecom Italia in Italy or Telstra in Australia). Despite insufficient upstream 
competition in Germany, Deutsche Telekom requested a regulatory holiday in order to be able 
to recoup its investment in VDSL technology. Discussion is still ongoing, now at the European   87 
level, on whether VDSL technology constitutes a new market and if at all, then how it should be 
regulated. Even though the upstream market shows different characteristics in the Netherlands, 
similar problem may arise when KPN enrols its all-IP network (see discussion below).  
Possible drawbacks of access regulation include its effects on investments and the incentive 
to engage in sabotage. These drawbacks should be taken into account when assessing whether 
access regulation is necessary. 
Investments may be suboptimal if a network is mandated to unbundle its facilities at a 
regulated price. A monopoly upstream firm may choose a lower level of quality increasing 
investment if access price is regulated and it is able to offer similar value-added services at the 
same quality level as its downstream rival. However if the network's ability to provide value-
added services is higher, it will over invest in order to foreclose its downstream rival (Foros 
(2005)).  
If access is regulated, firms may have incentives to engage in sabotage; a non-pricing 
strategy that harms rivals. In electronic communications market sabotage may include providing 
lower quality services to other downstream companies, e.g. in case of broadband access, lower 
speed or limited dataflow, blocking rivals' services, withholding information from competitors 
about how infrastructure can most efficiently be used or setting standards and structuring 
services in favour of its own subsidiary and at the expense of its rivals.
50 In this case for 
example quality of services may not be contractible since it may not be observed, or if it is 
observable, reasons for lower quality may not be verifiable. In the presence of access regulation 
a monopoly network may have an incentive to engage in sabotage (Mandy and Sappington 
(2007)). 
Conclusion 
According to the theory, anticompetitive foreclosure is relatively unlikely in the stylized version 
of the Dutch telecommunications market  presented above. If the drawbacks relating to network 
investments and the incentive to engage in sabotage are large enough, it may be welfare 
enhancing to choose a "do nothing policy" instead of the current asymmetric access regulation. 
However, the stylized model presented above is an approximation to the current situation in 
the Netherlands. Some (potential) market characteristics that may invalidate the conclusions 
based upon this stylized description have not been taken into account, are discussed below. 
 
50 A related and hotly debated topic is the issue of network neutrality in Internet services and applications. We interpret one 
type of violation of network neutrality as a form of anticompetitive quality discrimination at the upstream level by vertically 
integrated network operators. It may take the form of quality degradation or blocking rival’s competing services (see OECD, 
2007 and Kocsis and de Bijl, 2007).    88 
1. KPN's all-IP network 
A development potentially influencing our analysis is the roll-out of KPN’s all-IP network 
which intends to enable KPN to introduce qualitatively better network services. As a result, 
upstream products may become vertically differentiated. This potentially increases the risk of 
foreclosure of downstream entrants. However, even though foreclosure may take place, 
dynamic effects have a large weight in the assessment of pro-competitive effects which may 
offset the balance towards positive welfare effects. 
2. Switching costs for service providers 
In our stylized description, we’ve assumed that the upstream networks provide homogeneous 
services. However, despite being able to provide similar downstream services via both 
networks, the two networks are technically different and probably differ in the sense that the 
costs of connecting to a particular network differ. For a non-integrated downstream retailer 
there are costs associated with switching from one network provider to the other. Due to 
technical differences between the networks, switching requires investment in new hardware. 
According to market participants, these costs may be substantial. 
In the presence of upstream switching costs, there is a possibility that equilibrium contracts 
will be exclusive and that there will be no competition between networks for downstream 
entrants. In this case, competition will not drive down the access price entrants have to pay. 
3. Sabotage 
Finally, we’ve argued that anticompetitive foreclosure by means of (nonlinear) pricing is less 
likely. However, we have not considered the possibility of foreclosure through non-pricing 
instruments, such as quality degradation or sabotage. Although it is theoretically unclear 
whether incentives to engage in sabotage also exist in the absence of access regulation, it 
remains a real possibility that should be investigated.   89 
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